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Furtive Encryption: Power, Trust, and the
Constitutional Cost of Collective Surveillance
JEFFREY L. VAGLE*
Recent revelations of heretofore secret U.S. government surveillance programs
have sparked national conversations about their constitutionality and the delicate
balance between security and civil liberties in a constitutional democracy. Among
the revealed policies asserted by the National Security Agency (NSA) is a provision
found in the “minimization procedures” required under section 702 of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978. This provision allows the NSA to collect and
keep indefinitely any encrypted information collected from domestic
communications—including the communications of U.S. citizens. That is, according
to the U.S. government, the mere fact that a U.S. citizen has encrypted her
electronic communications is enough to give the NSA the right to store that data
until it is able to decrypt or decode it.
Through this provision, the NSA is automatically treating all electronic
communications from U.S. citizens that are hidden or obscured through
encryption—for whatever reason—as suspicious, a direct descendant of the
“nothing-to-hide” family of privacy minimization arguments. The ubiquity of
electronic communication in the United States and elsewhere has led to the
widespread use of encryption, the vast majority of it for innocuous purposes. This
Article argues that the mere encryption by individuals of their electronic
communications is not alone a basis for individualized suspicion. Moreover, this
Article asserts that the NSA’s policy amounts to a suspicionless search and seizure.
This program is therefore in direct conflict with the fundamental principles
underlying the Fourth Amendment, specifically the protection of individuals from
unwarranted government power and the establishment of the reciprocal trust
between citizen and government that is necessary for a healthy democracy.
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INTRODUCTION
In June 2013, a twenty-nine-year-old former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
systems administrator and NSA private contractor named Edward Snowden
publicly disclosed that he was the source of top-secret documents disclosed to
journalists regarding multiple secret surveillance programs within the NSA and
other agencies.1 The subsequent publication of some of these leaked government
documents has triggered a firestorm of discussion—often overheated—on topics
ranging from the nature of (and need for) government secrecy;2 the adequacy of
background checks for government employees and contractors;3 Mr. Snowden’s
girlfriend;4 Mr. Snowden’s status as hero or traitor;5 the plight of whistleblowers;6

1. See Barton Gellman, Aaron Blake & Greg Miller, Man Who Leaked NSA Secrets Steps
Forward, WASH. POST, Jun. 10, 2013, at A01; Glenn Greenwald, Ewan MacAskill & Laura
Poitras, Edward Snowden: The Man Responsible for the Leaks of Secret Documents Detailing
the NSA’s Widespread Phone and Internet Surveillance, GUARDIAN, June 10, 2013, at 2; Mark
Mazzetti & Michael S. Schmidt, Ex-C.I.A. Worker Says He Disclosed U.S. Surveillance, N.Y.
TIMES, June 10, 2013, at A1; M.G., Surveillance in America: Over to the Dark Side,
ECONOMIST (June 10, 2013), http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2013/06
/surveillance-america-0.
2. See, e.g., Mark Bowden, What Snowden and Manning Don’t Understand About
Secrecy, ATLANTIC (Aug. 23, 2013, 7:00 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive
/2013/08/bowden-manning-snowden/278973/.
3. See, e.g., Brent Kendall & Dion Nissenbaum, Leaker’s Security Check Faulted,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 2013, at A1.
4. See, e.g., Joe Coscarelli, Edward Snowden’s Girlfriend Is a Pole-Dancing Acrobat
with a Dramatic Blog, N.Y. MAG. (June 11, 2013, 9:14 AM), http://nymag.com/daily
/intelligencer/2013/06/edward-snowden-girlfriend-lindsay-mills-blog.html.
5. See, e.g., Dana Milbank, Editorial, Exposing the Zealous National Security State, WASH.
POST, Aug. 22, 2013, at A02.; Jeffrey Toobin, Edward Snowden’s Real Impact, NEW YORKER
(Aug. 19, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/edward-snowdens-real-impact.
6. See, e.g., Colman McCarthy, Whistleblowers Shine Necessary Light on US Shadows,
NAT’L CATH. REP., Aug. 30, 2013, at 24; Dana Milbank, Editorial, The Price of
Whistleblowing, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 2013, at A17; Adam Waytz, James Dungan & Liane
Young, The Whistle-Blower’s Quandry, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2013, at 12 SR; Eyal Press,
Whistleblower, Leaker, Traitor, Spy, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Aug. 5, 2013, 2:17 PM),
http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2013/aug/05/whistleblower-leaker-traitor-spy/.
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and, finally, the legality, necessity, and wisdom of the secret surveillance of U.S.
citizens.7
Hidden among the more dramatic revelations like PRISM8 and XKeyscore9 was
a document approved by U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder that articulated
“minimization procedures” required of the NSA under section 702 of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA).10 One of the provisions listed in this

7. The debate over government surveillance of its citizens has created some odd
bedfellows, with libertarian conservatives and (liberal) civil libertarians joining to oppose
neoconservatives, neoliberals, and supporters of the Obama administration. See, e.g., Philip
Giraldi, Edward Snowden Is No Traitor, AM. CONSERVATIVE (July 16, 2013),
http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/edward-snowden-is-no-traitor/; Michael
Hayden, Ex-CIA Chief: What Edward Snowden Did, CNN (July 19, 2013, 11:31 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/19/opinion/hayden-snowden-impact; Seth Mandel, Of Course
America Spies on the UN, COMMENT. MAG. (Aug. 27, 2013, 1:30 PM),
http://www.commentarymagazine.com/2013/08/27/of-course-america-spies-on-the-un/;
Karen McVeigh, NSA Surveillance Program Violates the Constitution, ACLU Says,
GUARDIAN (Aug. 27, 2013, 3:31 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/27/nsa
-surveillance-program-illegal-aclu-lawsuit; Susan Milligan, Snowden: Both a Hero and a
Traitor?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Aug. 1, 2013, 9:35 AM), http://www.usnews.com
/opinion/blogs/susan-milligan/2013/08/01/edward-snowden-leaves-russias-moscow-airport
-both-a-hero-and-a-traitor; Pierre Thomas, Mike Levine, Jack Date, Luis Martinez & Jack
Cloherty, Officials: How Edward Snowden Could Hurt the U.S., ABC NEWS (June 24, 2013,
6:38 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2013/06/officials-how-edward-snowden
-could-hurt-the-u-s/.
8. PRISM is the name of a formerly secret NSA mass-surveillance program that gathers
data by “tapping directly into the central servers of nine leading U.S. Internet companies,
extracting audio and video chats, photographs, e-mails, documents, and connection logs that
enable analysts to track foreign targets.” Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras, U.S. Mines Internet
Firms’ Data, Documents Show, WASH. POST, June 7, 2013, at A01.
9. XKeyscore is the name of a formerly clandestine NSA system used for searching
and analyzing the vast quantities of data collected from individuals across the globe. See,
e.g., Sean Gallagher, NSA’s Internet Taps Can Find Systems To Hack, Track VPNs and
Word Docs, ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 1, 2013, 5:30 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech
-policy/2013/08/nsas-internet-taps-can-find-systems-to-hack-track-vpns-and-word-docs/.
10. NSA, EXHIBIT B: MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES USED BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY
AGENCY IN CONNECTION WITH ACQUISITIONS OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION
(2007), available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jun/20/exhibit-b
-nsa-procedures-document [hereinafter MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES EXHIBIT B]. Section 702
of FISA articulates certain procedures and limitations that the Attorney General and the
Director of National Intelligence may jointly authorize on “the targeting of persons
reasonably believed to be located outside the United States to acquire foreign intelligence
information.” 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(a) (2012). Among these limitations, which require that any
surveillance “shall be conducted in a manner consistent with the fourth amendment to the
Constitution of the United States,” is the provision that the targeting of surveillance subjects
be subject to “minimization procedures” designed to “ensure that an acquisition authorized
under subsection (a) is limited to targeting persons reasonably believed to be located outside
the United States,” and to “prevent the intentional acquisition of any communication as to
which the sender and all intended recipients are known at the time of the acquisition to be
located in the United States.” § 1881a(b)–(e). Compliance with these FISA requirements is
subject to review by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. § 1881a(i)(1)(A).
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document applied specifically to encrypted information and allowed the NSA to
collect and keep indefinitely any information obtained from “domestic
communications”—which includes the communications of U.S. citizens—for
“cryptanalytic, traffic analytic or signal exploitation purposes.”11 In other words,
under these minimization procedures, the mere fact that data is encrypted is alone
enough to give the NSA the right to store that data (regardless of its U.S. or foreign
origin) and hold it for as long as it takes to decrypt it.12
The implications that flow from this policy are stunning. The NSA is
automatically treating all electronic communications from U.S. citizens that are
hidden or obscured through encryption—for whatever reason—as suspicious, a
direct descendant of the “nothing-to-hide” family of privacy minimization
arguments. Common arguments made in the defense of government surveillance
typically follow one of two closely related themes: “If you have nothing to hide,
you have nothing to fear” (the government’s perspective), or “I have nothing to
hide, so I have no objection to government surveillance.” These “nothing-to-hide”
arguments and their ilk can be superficially compelling and have been made for
some time.13 But don’t we all have something to hide? After all, as Lavrenti Beria,
head of Joseph Stalin’s secret police, supposedly said, “Show me the man, and I’ll
find you the crime.”14 This is a rather weak response, however, especially against a
“nothing-to-hide” argument based on minimal, nonpublic intrusions of privacy
interests. Scholars and commentators have addressed the “nothing-to-hide”
argument in more depth.15
Putting aside the fact that the NSA had been less than truthful—both to the
public as well as to other branches of government—about the existence and nature
of such broad and legally questionable surveillance programs,16 this sort of blanket

11. MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES EXHIBIT B, supra note 10, at 2.
12. “In the context of cryptanalytic effort, maintenance of technical data bases requires
retention of all communications that are enciphered or reasonably believed to contain secret
meaning, and sufficient duration may consist of any period of time during which encrypted
material is subject to, or of use in, cryptanalysis.” Id. at 5.
13. See, e.g., HENRY JAMES, THE REVERBERATOR 183 (Grove Press, Inc. 1979) (1888)
(“[I]f these people had done bad things they ought to be ashamed of themselves and he
couldn’t pity them, and if they hadn’t done them there was no need of making such a rumpus
about other people knowing.”).
14. Roger Cohen, The Real Threat to America, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/26/opinion/26iht-edcohen.html.
15. See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE: THE FALSE TRADEOFF BETWEEN
PRIVACY AND SECURITY (2011); Jennifer Granick, Surveillance Myth #1: I Have Nothing To
Hide, STAN. L. SCH. CENTER FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y (June 24, 2013, 12:58 PM),
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2013/06/surveillance-myth-1-i-have-nothing-hide; Bruce
Schneier, The Eternal Value of Privacy, WIRED (May 18, 2006), http://www.wired.com
/politics/security/commentary/securitymatters/2006/05/70886. I will explore this issue in
more detail in Part II, infra.
16. In March 2013, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper testified before
Congress and was asked whether the NSA collected any type of data on U.S. citizens. He
responded, “No sir.” Once the documents revealed by Edward Snowden in June 2013 made
it clear that this denial was simply not true, Mr. Clapper told NBC that his answer had been
the “least untruthful” answer possible. Tabassum Zakaria, U.S. Spy Agency Edges into the
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suspicion by a government of its citizens goes far beyond the “individualized
suspicion of wrongdoing” generally required by the Fourth Amendment for a
reasonable search.17 Exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement
have been established in the past few decades to permit searches under specified
conditions: the government may have “special needs” beyond the scope of normal
law enforcement,18 or the government may have a foreign intelligence surveillance
exemption.19 In this Article, I argue that neither limited exception applies here.
Furthermore, generalized domestic government surveillance programs have been
anathema to Americans from the earliest days of the nation,20 and the use of
technological methods to achieve what the Framers would have found abhorrent21 is
feeding an accelerating erosion of trust between the U.S. government and its people.
This Article is an effort to demonstrate how collective surveillance without a
basis of suspicion not only violates the Fourth Amendment but does so in a way
that corrupts two principal constitutional tenets—protection of individuals from
undue governmental power and the mutual trust between government and citizen
that must exist in a healthy democratic society.22 Current Fourth Amendment
Light After Snowden Revelations, REUTERS, Aug. 25, 2013, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/25/us-usa-security-nsa-idUSBRE97O08120130825;
see also Ruth Marcus, Editorial, More NSA Deceptions, WASH. POST, Aug. 23, 2013, at A19;
John Fund, Time for Answers from the NSA, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Aug. 19, 2013, 4:00 AM),
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/356098/time-answers-nsa-john-fund.
17. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000) (citing Chandler v. Miller,
520 U.S. 305, 308 (1997)).
18. The “special needs” doctrine has been applied in certain limited circumstances to
uphold suspicionless searches where the government program was designed to serve “special
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement.” Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515
U.S. 646, 653 (1995) (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)) (applying
doctrine to random drug testing of student athletes); see also Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v.
Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665–66 (1989) (applying doctrine to drug tests for United States
Customs Service employees seeking transfer or promotion to certain positions); Skinner v. Ry.
Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619–20 (1989) (applying doctrine to drug and alcohol tests
for railway employees involved in train accidents or found to be in violation of particular safety
regulations). I will examine the applicability of this doctrine to the NSA’s policy of
suspicionless collection and indefinite storage of all domestic encrypted data in Part II, infra.
19. I will more fully discuss FISA, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1871 (2012), and related Fourth
Amendment exceptions under “national security” conditions, in Part II.E, infra. I will note
here that the Supreme Court has held that a domestic surveillance exception to the Fourth
Amendment does not exist, even when the surveillance is under the umbrella of national
security. See United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
20. “The makers of our Constitution . . . conferred, as against the Government, the right
to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy
of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth
Amendment.” Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting), overruled in part by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
21. See Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. at 655 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (expressing
opinion that “the Framers would be appalled by the vision of mass governmental intrusions”).
22. In this Article, I distinguish collective or pervasive surveillance of the kind revealed
in the Snowden documents, which show implementation and execution of such surveillance
without benefit of law, from targeted surveillance of individuals, which requires court
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doctrine has, unfortunately, largely ignored these principles in favor of a balancing
test between the needs of the government and an individual’s reasonable
expectation of privacy.23 While privacy indeed emerges from these principles,
advances in surveillance-enabling technologies are rapidly making privacy a poor
proxy for protection from government power and the enhancement of mutual
societal trust. The Supreme Court’s shift to a factual analysis and quantification of
privacy has drawn attention away from the consideration of fundamental
constitutional values and has led to some rather bizarre, fact-specific arguments.
I argue that our current Fourth Amendment theories of privacy have become a
sort of Maginot Line: a once-powerful deterrent made gradually irrelevant by
technological advances, one that has therefore become unable to protect individuals
from a government with the technological capability and desire to collect and store
for future reading that which we have clearly designated as private—our encrypted
data. Faced with this reality, we must adjust Fourth Amendment doctrine to protect
the underlying constitutional principles at stake.
I begin in Part I with a necessary, but brief, introduction to encryption, its uses,
and why it provides an important bulwark against unreasonable government
intrusions. Part II examines the amorphous concepts of security, secrecy, and
privacy, as well as the mistaken presumption by courts of privacy’s factual and
quantifiable nature. This Part additionally provides a historical analysis of Fourth
Amendment doctrine and its tense relationship with technology. I also examine the
historical underpinnings of current Fourth Amendment “balancing” doctrine in
light of what Foucault referred to as panopticism.24 In Part III, I argue that the
generalized, arbitrary, and warrantless collection by government of its citizens’
private communications, merely because those citizens wish to keep those
communications private, is in direct conflict with the constitutional intent to protect
individuals from undue state power. In Part IV, I return to an analysis of current
Fourth Amendment doctrine to argue that this doctrine, based on a
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test, neglects the important constitutional value
of trust. I make the case that one of the core principles that gave life to the
Constitution is the philosophy that reciprocal trust between government and its
citizens is necessary for a healthy democratic society.
I. A GENTLE INTRODUCTION TO CRYPTOGRAPHY
A. Why Encrypt?
The practice of encrypting communications to ensure (or attempt to ensure) their
privacy has existed in one form or another for thousands of years.25 While not all of
the examples over the past 4000 years would appear on their surface to be
approval on a case-by-case basis.
23. See infra Part II.A–B.
24. Panopticism is defined as the type of power applied by the State to individual
citizens in the form of continuous individual supervision. See Michel Foucault, Truth and
Juridical Forms, in POWER: ESSENTIAL WORKS OF FOUCAULT 1954–1984, at 1, 70 (James D.
Faubion ed., Robert Hurley et al. trans., The New Press 1994).
25. The earliest known evidence of secret writing—or encryption—dates back to about
1900 BC. See DAVID KAHN, THE CODEBREAKERS: THE STORY OF SECRET WRITING 71 (1967).
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encryption as we now know it, different forms of cryptography26 have been used by
priests,27 emperors,28 diplomats,29 generals,30 spies,31 merchants,32 insurgents,33
dissidents,34 criminals,35 prisoners, and lovers.36 Clearly, the specific reasons
behind an individual’s desire to obscure or otherwise hide her communications or

26. Cryptography is the science of creating and using methods of obscuring or
disguising messages with ciphers, codes, and other techniques so that only certain people can
read the original (unencrypted) message. A cipher is a method of encrypting any text
regardless of its content. A code is a system of communication that relies on a prearranged
mapping of meanings, for example, a codebook. Cryptology is the study of cryptography and
cryptanalysis. See id. at xiii–xvi.
27. Examples of religious uses of cryptography range from ancient Egyptian hieroglyphics
on tomb walls, to the use of substitutions in Hebrew Holy Scriptures, to fourteenth-century
Koranic writings, to Viking Age cipher runes. It is not always clear what the reasoning was
behind encrypting religious texts, but scholars generally believe that the secrecy added to the
mystery and arcane magical powers of religious writings. See id. at 71–98.
28. It is believed that Julius Caesar used a cipher to encrypt his messages to Cicero and
others, which substituted the letters of the original text with letters three places further down the
alphabet. To this day, such substitution ciphers are called Caesar ciphers. See id. at 83–84.
29. Blaise de Vigenère, the inventor of the archetype of polyalphabetic substitution
cipher systems, was first exposed to cryptology in 1549 while he was a diplomat in service
to the Duke of Nevers. Id. at 145–46.
30. In eleventh century China, the military document Wu-ching tsung-yao (“Essentials
from Military Classics”) prescribed a code of forty items ranging from requests for arrows to
reports from front lines. Id. at 73.
31. Artha-śāstra, the classic Indian work on statecraft, describes the espionage service
of India and recommends that spies be given assignments via secret writings. Id. at 74.
32. An early example of encryption to protect valuable intellectual property was found in a
3500-year-old remnant of a Mesopotamian potter’s cipher to protect his new glazing formula.
BRUCE SCHNEIER, SECRETS AND LIES: DIGITAL SECURITY IN A NETWORKED WORLD 86 (2000).
33. During the French wars of religion, Huguenots encrypted their internal
correspondence. The decryption of one of these messages by the French royal army in 1628
led to the surrender of Huguenot forces at Realmont. KAHN, supra note 25, at 157.
34. For their official correspondence, Tibetans use a cipher called “rin-spuns,” named
for its inventor Rin-c’(hhen-)spuns(-pa), who lived in the fourteenth century. Id. at 84.
35. During the era of Prohibition in the United States, bootleggers used encoded radio
messages to coordinate the movement between ships smuggling liquor from overseas and the
small speedboats that would bring the cargo ashore. Id. at 802–03.
36. Ovid, in the Art of Love, counseled secret lovers on how to keep their
correspondence secret:
If the guard sees through these tricks, she can go one better: / Offer her back to
write on, be your letter. / Safe and undetectable by the eye / Is writing in milk—
later, just apply / A sprinkling of coal-dust and presto! you can read. / Or write
in oil of linseed / Oozing from a stalk of flax— / And your words are invisible
on what seems blank wax.
OVID, THE ART OF LOVE bk. 3, at 157 (James Michie trans., Modern Library 2002) (c. 2 C.E.)
(emphasis in original).
In the nineteenth century, lovers would secretly contact one another through encrypted
messages in so-called agony columns of newspapers. Unfortunately for the communicants,
most of these messages were encrypted using elementary encryption methods, such that almost
anyone could decipher these messages with a bit of effort. KAHN, supra note 25, at 775.
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papers from unwanted gazes can vary widely. But there is a common thread
throughout history of a strong—perhaps innate—need for people to have the ability
to keep certain things secret.37
One of the more dramatic historical uses of cryptography—and a cautionary tale
for those tempted to use weak encryption methods—can be found in the tragic tale
of Mary, Queen of Scots.38 While imprisoned in England by Queen Elizabeth I,
Mary used a cipher to encrypt her correspondence with her supporters.39 Queen
Elizabeth, correctly sensing threats to her government (and person) at home and
abroad, tasked Sir Francis Walsingham with establishing an espionage network
throughout England and Europe.40 Walsingham’s agents intercepted Mary’s
encrypted messages and discovered a plot to assassinate Elizabeth and install Mary
in her place.41 Mary’s coconspirators were quickly arrested and subsequently
executed. Mary was tried in October of that year; in February 1587, Queen
Elizabeth signed Mary’s death warrant, and she was beheaded.42
At its core, the ability to keep things secret is a form of power.43 Similarly, the
ability to learn someone’s secrets—either surreptitiously or overtly—and use the
information learned is also a form of power. The conflict between the individual’s
power to keep her secrets from the government and the government’s power to
learn those secrets creates tensions that tend to manifest themselves in arguments
over privacy. In this context, “the right to privacy has everything to do with
delineating the legitimate limits of governmental power.”44
Until relatively recently, however, those who wished to keep their
communications secret could be much more confident in their privacy than they can
today. Simply finding a secluded area well out of earshot of potential
eavesdroppers could defeat all adversaries until the invention of the parabolic
microphone and similar technologies. If the parties weren’t able to have such a
face-to-face private conversation, they could encrypt their letters using

37.
Without the ability to keep secrets, individuals lose the capacity to distinguish
themselves from others, to maintain independent lives, to be complete and
autonomous persons . . . . This does not mean that a person actually has to keep
secrets to be autonomous, just that she must possess the ability to do so. The
ability to keep secrets implies the ability to disclose secrets selectively, and so
the capacity for selective disclosure at one’s own discretion is important to
individual autonomy as well.
KIM LANE SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS: EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY IN THE COMMON LAW 302
(1988) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
38. SIMON SINGH, THE CODE BOOK: THE EVOLUTION OF SECRECY FROM MARY QUEEN OF
SCOTS TO QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY 32–44 (1999).
39. Id. at 37–40.
40. See id. at 39.
41. Id. at 40–41.
42. Id. at 42–44.
43. While “[a] measure of control over secrecy and openness—and thus of one form of
power—is needed in personal life for equilibrium, liberty, even survival,” when linked,
“secrecy and political power are dangerous in the extreme.” SISSELA BOK, SECRETS: ON THE
ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION 106 (1982).
44. Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 737 (1989).
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then-unbreakable ciphers.45 Even long after the proliferation of the telephone, it
was difficult to trace incoming calls due to the slow mechanical equipment used by
the carriers, even with a warrant.46
Today, networked computing and communication has permeated everyday life.47
For most of us, significant amounts of information describing our purchases,
comings and goings, likes and dislikes, circles of friends, socioeconomic statuses,
affiliations, and thoughts now make their way across countless unknown networks
to be stored on countless unknown servers and potentially accessible to any number
of interested parties. We may choose to willingly share some of this data, or we
may concede that certain pieces of information are analogous to our activities while
walking down a public street—it may be impossible to control their observation
and dissemination. But there are certain segments of our lives that we may only
choose to share with a select few. For example, you may see me walk into a bank’s
local branch and might therefore assume that I have an account there. I am likely
aware of this fact, but it does not follow that I want to share my account balances
with you as well. In another example, you may send an e-mail rather than a letter to
your spouse, but that does not necessarily mean that your expectations of privacy in
that e-mail are any different than if you sealed an envelope and entrusted it to the
care of the Postal Service. Here, cryptography helps to regain some control over
what data we choose to make public.
B. A Political History of Encryption in the United States
The U.S. government’s views on the general availability of strong cryptography
are complicated. Since World War I, the government has been heavily invested in
the research and development of cryptographic systems. It had largely managed to
keep a lid on these methods into the 1960s.48 In 1967, despite the NSA’s best

45. The Vigenère cipher was considered unbreakable in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries. See SINGH, supra note 38, at 62–63. Successfully encrypting letters was, however,
no guarantee that the intended recipient would ever receive them.
46. Prior to the invention of the transistor or the microprocessor, the routing of
telephone calls took place using the equivalent of “stone knives and bearskins”—giant
mechanical switches “jam-packed with wipers and ratchets and pawls and blades and other
mechanical clockwork.” PHIL LAPSLEY, EXPLODING THE PHONE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE
TEENAGERS AND OUTLAWS WHO HACKED MA BELL 42–44 (2013).
47. William Gibson has aptly described this phenomenon as the eversion of cyberspace.
See David Wallace-Wells, William Gibson: The Art of Fiction No. 211, PARIS REV., Summer
2011, at 107, available at http://www.theparisreview.org/interviews/6089/the-art-of-fiction
-no-211-william-gibson. That is, the Internet (“cyberspace”) we once thought of as elsewhere,
accessible only through large, bulky boxes that were found only on desktops, and later, smaller
(but still bulky) boxes we could optimistically use on our laps, has “colonized” our world—
both physically, through networked computers we carry in our pocket and archaically call
“phones,” and sociologically, through our increased dependence on its availability. See William
Gibson, Op-Ed., Google’s Earth, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2010, at A23.
48. World War I was the first war to be fought with the general availability of radio
technology. Since radio broadcasts were, by definition, available to anyone with a receiver,
governments quickly realized that some kind of cryptographic system had to be employed to
ensure the secrecy of communications. The rapid advance of technology following the war,
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efforts to quash it, David Kahn published The Codebreakers, the first nontechnical
history of cryptography, which included descriptions of the technologies used in
encryption and why they were important.49 Kahn’s book sparked a renewed and
widespread interest in cryptography among scientists and engineers working
outside the walls of the NSA.50 By the early 1970s, the NSA conceded that
cryptographic technologies should be made available to other agencies within the
U.S. government. Together with the National Bureau of Standards, the NSA
solicited industry proposals for a new cryptographic standard, which eventually
resulted in the publication of the Data Encryption Standard (DES) in 1977.51
But the cryptographic genie truly left the government bottle in 1976 with the
publication of a paper by two Stanford University researchers, which described a
new cryptographic concept called “public key cryptography.”52 By 1977, three
young MIT professors—Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Len Adleman—built upon
the concepts articulated in this paper to invent the first public-key encryption
system, naming it with their initials (RSA).53 Rivest was invited to present his work
at the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) annual meeting in
coupled with secret research done under the auspices of what would become the NSA,
yielded improved automation and security of these secret government cryptosystems. See
WHITFIELD DIFFIE & SUSAN LANDAU, PRIVACY ON THE LINE: THE POLITICS OF WIRETAPPING
AND ENCRYPTION 49–53 (1998); KAHN, supra note 25, at 298–350.
49. Kahn’s original manuscript contained information about the NSA, and the agency
made attempts to stop its publication, including writing negative reviews of the work to be
disseminated through the press to discredit him. JAMES BAMFORD, THE PUZZLE PALACE: A
REPORT ON AMERICA’S MOST SECRET AGENCY 168–69 (1982). Kahn and his publisher
eventually agreed to remove material concerning the relationship between the NSA and its
British counterpart, the Government Communications Headquarters. Id. at 171–72.
50. The NSA began losing its monopoly on cryptography research even within the U.S.
government. In 1944, a young German immigrant named Horst Feistel was granted U.S.
citizenship, a security clearance, and a job at the Air Force Cambridge Research Center
(AFCRC), a U.S. Air Force think tank dedicated to improving the cryptographic systems
used in the identification of friendly—and unfriendly—aircraft. DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra
note 48, at 56–57. After the NSA discovered this research, it shut down the AFCRC and
appropriated the technology. Feistel then took his research to the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (MIT), Mitre, and eventually IBM. Id.
51. See SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, U.S. SENATE, UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY:
INVOLVEMENT OF NSA IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DATA ENCRYPTION STANDARD (1978),
available at http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/pdfs/95nsa.pdf.
52. Whitfield Diffie & Martin E. Hellman, New Directions in Cryptography, 22 IEEE
TRANSACTIONS ON INFO. THEORY 644 (1976), available at http://www-ee.stanford.edu
/~hellman/publications/24.pdf. The revolutionary concept behind public-key cryptography
lies in its ability to “split” the cryptographic key into two parts, a public key and a private
key. Applying the mathematical principles I discuss in Part I.C, infra, Diffie and Hellman
showed that, using their approach—aptly named the Diffie-Hellman key exchange—one
could generate public-private key pairs in such a way that it was computationally infeasible
to derive the private key solely from the public key. Id. Thus, Alice could share her public
key with the world, which would allow Bob (and others) to encrypt messages to her using
that key that could only be decrypted with Alice’s secret key.
53. See R. L. Rivest, A. Shamir & L. Adelman, A Method for Obtaining Digital
Signatures and Public-Key Cryptosystems, COMM. ACM, Feb. 1978, at 120, 126, available
at http://ocw.bib.upct.es/pluginfile.php/5337/mod_resource/content/1/rsa_base.pdf.
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October 1977, but the IEEE received a letter warning that Rivest’s talk was a
potential violation of the U.S. International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR),54
since foreign nationals would likely be present at the meeting.55
The ITAR regulates the import and export of defense-related goods and services
by designating such items to the United States Munitions List (USML), as
authorized under the Arms Export Control Act (AECA).56 Items listed on the
USML, unless otherwise exempted, require a license to import or export.57 In the
past, these items included “[c]ryptographic (including key management) systems,
equipment, assemblies, modules, integrated circuits, components or software with
the capability of maintaining secrecy or confidentiality of information or
information systems.”58
The government’s use of ITAR to control the import and export of nonmilitary
cryptographic systems and software was curtailed in 1996 when a California
federal district court was asked to decide whether the ITAR licensing requirements
constituted unlawful prior restraint, thus violating the First Amendment right to
free expression.59 The plaintiff in Bernstein was a University of California,
Berkeley graduate student in mathematics who developed an encryption algorithm
he called “Snuffle.”60 Bernstein had documented his algorithm both as an academic

54. 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (2012).
55. See Stephen H. Unger, Privacy, Cryptography and Free Research, IEEE TECH. &
SOC’Y, Dec. 1977, at 8. It was later discovered that the letter’s author worked for the NSA.
The NSA denied any connection with the letter, and Rivest presented his paper at the IEEE
conference in October. DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 48, at 61–62.
56. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(1).
57. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(b)(2). The USML divides munitions into twenty-one categories.
Category XIII of the USML (“Auxiliary Military Equipment”) included all cryptographic
systems, but has since been revised to include only those “cryptographic devices, software,
and components specifically designed, developed, modified, adapted, or configured for
military applications.” 22 C.F.R § 121.1 (2013). As of January 6, 2014, new Category XIII
language applies and includes in part:
Information security or information assurance systems and equipment,
cryptographic devices, software, and components, as follows:
. . . Military or intelligence cryptographic (including key management)
systems, equipment, assemblies, modules, integrated circuits, components, and
software (including their cryptographic interfaces) capable of maintaining
secrecy or confidentiality of information or information systems, including
equipment or software for tracking, telemetry, and control (TT&C) encryption
and decryption.
22 C.F.R. § 121.1 (2014).
58. 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 (1996).
59. See Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132, 1146–47 (9th Cir. 1999)
[hereinafter Bernstein IV] (affirming district court decision that export regulations on
encryption items are unconstitutional), withdrawn pending en banc reh’g, 192 F.3d 1308
(9th Cir. 1999).
60. Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426, 1429 (N.D. Cal. 1996)
[hereinafter Bernstein I]; Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 945 F. Supp. 1279, 1283 (N.D.
Cal. 1996) [hereinafter Bernstein II]; Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 974 F. Supp. 1288,
1293 (N.D. Cal. 1997) [hereinafter Bernstein III]. Bernstein I and II challenged the
encryption export control provisions of ITAR. After Bernstein II, President Clinton shifted
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paper and in computer source code, and he wished to publish and otherwise
communicate his findings.61 When he sought a determination from the State
Department as to whether his paper and source code were controlled under ITAR,
the State Department replied that Bernstein’s source code was a defense article
under Category XIII of ITAR and therefore subject to licensing by the State
Department prior to export.62
Bernstein filed suit in the Northern District of California, seeking a declaratory
judgment against the U.S. Department of State to prevent it from enforcing ITAR
against him.63 The court observed that “[Bernstein’s] paper, an academic writing
explaining [his] scientific work . . . is speech of the most protected kind.”64 As to
the source code, the court pointed out that “Bernstein’s encryption system is
written, albeit in computer language,” and the court could “find no meaningful
difference between computer language . . . and German or French.”65 In Bernstein
II, the court held that the licensing requirement for cryptographic software under
Category XIII of the USML was an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech, stating
that “even if a government may constitutionally impose content-neutral prohibitions
on a particular manner of speech, it may not condition that speech on obtaining a
license or permit from a government official in that official’s boundless discretion.”66
In 1982, the inventors of RSA founded a corporation around their cryptographic
algorithm, and they proposed—unsuccessfully—that RSA become a federal
cryptographic standard, like DES.67 But until the prospect of global e-commerce
ITAR licensing authority for encryption exports to the Department of Commerce. See Exec.
Order No. 13,026, 61 Fed. Reg. 58,767 (Nov. 19, 1996); see also Encryption Items
Transferred from the U.S. Munitions List to the Commerce Control List, 61 Fed. Reg.
68,572 (Dec. 30, 1996). In Bernstein III, the district court held that the Commerce
Department’s encryption export regulations were constitutionally indistinguishable from
ITAR with respect to encryption and were therefore unconstitutional. 974 F. Supp. at 1306–08.
61. Bernstein I, 922 F. Supp. at 1429–30. Source code is the text of a computer program
and is generally written in a high-level language that is two or more steps removed from
machine language, which is a low-level language. High-level languages are closer to natural
language than low-level languages, which direct the functioning of the computer. Source
code must be translated by way of a translating program into machine language before it can
be read by a computer. The object code is the output of that translation. It is possible to write
a source program in high-level language without knowing about the actual functions of the
computer that carry out the program. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPUTER SCIENCE 962, 1263–
64 (Anthony Ralston & Edwin D. Reilly eds., 3d ed. 1993).
62. Bernstein I, 922 F. Supp. at 1430.
63. Id. at 1428.
64. Id. at 1434.
65. Id. at 1434–35.
66. 945 F. Supp. at 1286 (emphasis in original) (quoting Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g
Co., 486 U.S. 750, 764 (1988)). The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Bernstein IV was withdrawn
when the court voted to rehear the case en banc, and then the case settled before the en banc
decision was rendered. See Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, No. C 95-0582 MHP, 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6672, at *2 (Apr. 19, 2004). Therefore, the decision in Bernstein IV is no
longer valid, even though the underlying decision in Bernstein III presumably is.
67. In 1982, the U.S. government solicited proposals for a national public-key
cryptography standard. Solicitation for Public Key Cryptographic Algorithms, 47 Fed. Reg.
28,445 (June 30, 1982). RSA Data Security prepared a proposal to make RSA the national
standard. The NSA, however, blocked their submission by requesting that the plan to
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became feasible through the rapid worldwide adoption of the Internet, commercial
interest in cryptographic systems remained a niche business.68 The reawakened
interest in cryptographic systems remained in this semidormant state until someone
took steps to put strong cryptography in the hands of the general public.69
In 1991, a computer programmer named Phil Zimmermann wrote a program that
used the RSA public-key cryptographic algorithm to protect the privacy of e-mail;
he called the program “Pretty Good Privacy”—PGP for short—and made it
publicly available over the Internet.70 Zimmermann wrote and published PGP in
response to Senate Bill 266, an omnibus anticrime bill, which contained a hidden
requirement that would have forced makers of cryptographic equipment to insert
secret “back doors” into their products so that the government could decrypt and
read anyone’s encrypted messages.71 Zimmermann’s goal was to get strong

develop a national public-key cryptography standard be dropped. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, GAO/OSI-94-2, COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY: FEDERAL POLICY AND ACTIONS 5 (1993).
68. Cryptographic systems to ensure secured communications remained a tough sell
(outside of governments) throughout the 1980s. For much of this time, the selling of
cryptography was likened to the selling of insurance, in that the customer was expected to pay
to protect against an event that may never happen. See DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 48, at 46.
69. The term strong cryptography—as opposed to weak cryptography—has no precise
definition, since the standard against which we might measure “strong cryptography” today
will undoubtedly change over time as computers become more powerful and research reveals
new cryptographic techniques. For the purposes of this Article, I will borrow a definition
from Bruce Schneier: “There are two kinds of cryptography in this world: cryptography that
will stop your kid sister from reading your files, and cryptography that will stop major
governments from reading your files. [Strong cryptography is] the latter.” BRUCE SCHNEIER,
APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY, at xix (2d. ed 1996).
Another critical characteristic of successful, strong cryptosystems is their adherence to
what is known as Kerckhoff’s Principle, which states that the security of an encryption
scheme must depend only on the secrecy of the key(s) and not on the secrecy of the
algorithm or methods. See NIELS FERGUSON, BRUCE SCHNEIER & TADAYOSHI KOHNO,
CRYPTOGRAPHY ENGINEERING: DESIGN PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS 24–25
(2010). The reasoning behind this important principle is based in the overall security of the
system—the fewer the secrets that one must keep in order to ensure a system’s security, the
easier it will be to maintain that security. Every secret in a cryptosystem is a potential failure
point for that system.
70. See Elizabeth Lauzon, The Philip Zimmermann Investigation: The Start of the Fall
of Export Restrictions on Encryption Software Under First Amendment Free Speech Issues,
48 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1307, 1321–22 (1998).
71. See 1 PHILIP ZIMMERMANN, THE OFFICIAL PGP USER’S GUIDE 5–7 (1995) (discussing the
reasons for writing, publishing, and using PGP). While these measures ultimately failed, it has
since been discovered that the NSA has been conducting a secret program to establish “back
doors” into cryptographic systems and other security products by collaborating directly with
technology companies. See, e.g, Nicole Perlroth, Jeff Larson & Scott Shane, N.S.A. Able To Foil
Basic Safeguards of Privacy on Web, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2013, at A1. These efforts, revealed
through the formerly secret documents leaked by Edward Snowden, have been roundly criticized
by experts and security companies as bad for security. See Ed Felten, NSA Apparently
Undermining Standards, Security, Confidence, FREEDOM TO TINKER (Sept. 9, 2013), https://
freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/felten/nsa-apparently-undermining-standards-security-confidence/;
Dan Goodin, Stop Using NSA-Influenced Code in Our Products, RSA Tells Customers, ARS
TECHNICA (Sept. 19, 2013, 7:43 PM), http://arstechnica.com/security/2013/09/stop-using-nsa

114

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 90:101

cryptography into the hands of everyone, explaining that, until he published PGP,
“ordinary people and grassroots political organizations mostly have not had access
to affordable ‘military grade’ public-key cryptographic technology.”72
The Internet being a global medium, copies of Zimmermann’s PGP quickly
found their way outside U.S. borders, a violation of the AECA and ITAR.73
Additionally, there was some speculation that Zimmermann’s use of the RSA
algorithm infringed the Rivest-Shamir-Adleman patent, although the claim was
probably pretextual.74 In February 1993, Zimmermann was visited by U.S. Customs
Service agents who were investigating a complaint from RSA Data Security
alleging the theft and international shipment of their intellectual property.75 The
seed of this initial inquiry quickly bloomed into an investigation of possible ITAR
violations by a U.S. Attorney.76 For years, Zimmermann remained under an
investigatory cloud but was never indicted, most likely due to the inexplicable
contradictions posed by the export restrictions articulated in ITAR.77
-influence-code-in-our-product-rsa-tells-customers/; Matthew Green, On the NSA, FEW
THOUGHTS ON CRYPTOGRAPHIC ENGINEERING (Sept. 6, 2013, 2:27 AM), http://
blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/09/on-nsa.html; Matthew Green, The Many Flaws of
Dual_EC_DRBG, FEW THOUGHTS ON CRYPTOGRAPHIC ENGINEERING (Sept. 18, 2013, 7:28 PM),
http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/09/the-many-flaws-of-dualecdrbg.html?
[hereinafter Green, Many Flaws]; David Meyer, Dear NSA, Thanks for Making Us All Insecure,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 6, 2013) http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-09
-06/dear-nsa-thanks-for-making-us-all-insecure.
72. 1 ZIMMERMANN, supra note 71, at 7. To further enable the spread of PGP as far and as
fast as possible, Zimmermann released his software as open-source freeware, giving everyone
full and free access to the underlying source code used to implement RSA. 2 id. at 96–98.
73. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. As the court in Bernstein II observed,
“[i]t seems reasonably clear that uploading an item to an Internet site that can be accessed in
a foreign country constitutes ‘sending’ a defense article out of the country.” 945 F. Supp.
1279, 1294 (N.D. Cal. 1996). “Furthermore, exportation as defined by the ITAR would
appear to include publication where publication, such as posting software on the Internet or
distributing it freely among colleagues, could be said to be tantamount to sending it out of
the United States ‘in any manner.’” Id. at 1288 (quoting 22 C.F.R. § 120.17(a)(1) (1996));
see also 22 C.F.R. §§ 120.1–120.9.
74. MIT was granted U.S. Patent 4,405,829 for a “Cryptographic Communications
System and Method” that described the RSA algorithm in 1983. Cryptographic Commc’ns
Sys. & Method, U.S. Patent No. 4,405,829 (filed Dec. 14, 1977) (issued Sept. 20, 1983). The
patent would have expired on September 21, 2000, but the algorithm was released into the
public domain by RSA Security on September 6, 2000. Press Release, RSA Security Inc.,
RSA Security Releases RSA Encryption Algorithm into Public Domain (Sept. 6, 2000),
available at http://www.linuxtoday.com/infrastructure/2000090600606PRCYSW.
75. See STEVEN LEVY, CRYPTO: HOW THE CODE REBELS BEAT THE GOVERNMENT—
SAVING PRIVACY IN THE DIGITAL AGE 287–88 (2001). From the start, it was clear that the
U.S. Customs agents were ill prepared to understand the technical ramifications of the
cryptographic software. They asked Zimmermann questions about the means he used to
distribute PGP overseas, but Zimmermann had to explain to them the basic ideas behind
cryptography and the distribution of data over the Internet. Id. at 287; see also DIFFIE &
LANDAU, supra note 48, at 205–06; Lauzon, supra note 70, at 1327.
76. See LEVY, supra note 75, at 288; Lauzon, supra note 70, at 1327.
77. The U.S. Department of Justice investigation of Zimmermann closed without
comment from the U.S. Attorney on January 11, 1996. See Significant Moments in PGP’s
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Since the mid-1990s, the civilian and commercial use of cryptographic systems
has become widespread, driven initially by concerns for the safety of financial data in
electronic commerce and electronic banking but eventually making its way into
almost every aspect of our electronic lives.78 Despite subsequent attempts by the U.S.
government to regain exclusive control over the research, implementation, and
proliferation of cryptographic technologies, strong crypto has made its way around
the globe.79 This tension between governments and their citizens regarding the use of
History: Zimmermann Case Dropped, PHILZIMMERMAN.COM (Jan. 12, 1996, 11:37 PM),
https://www.philzimmermann.com/EN/news/PRZ_case_dropped.html. It was clear to many
commentators, however, that confusion over ITAR export regulations made enforcement
difficult and often absurd. For example, Bruce Schneier’s 1994 book, Applied Cryptography,
supra note 69, also attracted the attention of the U.S. government, as it contained detailed
mathematical descriptions and explanations of many cryptographic systems. Under the ITAR
export regulations, the book itself could be shipped internationally, as the restrictions on the
export of cryptographic systems appeared to apply only to strong cryptography in digital
form. That is, the book could be exported, but a disk containing the book’s contents could
not. This interpretation was confirmed when cryptography researcher Phil Karn applied for a
“commodities jurisdiction” to export the book along with a floppy disk containing code from
the book. The U.S. Department of State replied to Karn that the book could be exported, but
the floppy disk could not. See Letter from Thomas E. McNamara, Assistant Secretary of
State for Political-Military Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Philip R. Karn, Jr. (June 13,
1995), available at http://www.toad.com/gnu/export/mcnamara-response.html. As if to
thumb its nose at this bizarre export policy, the MIT Press published a book that contained
nothing but the source code to the entire PGP program. See LEVY, supra note 75, at 290. The
933-page book has since become a collector’s item, with mint condition copies selling for
$200–$300. See PGP: Source Code and Internals, AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com
/PGP-Internals-Philip-R-Zimmermann/dp/0262240394.
78. Most modern encryption technology operates “behind the curtain” for the average
person. For example, every modern web browser contains cryptographic functionality that
enables users to establish secure connections to websites using established protocols like
Transport Layer Security (TLS), or its predecessor, Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), but these
protocols are designed to require little or no technical expertise from web users. See William
Stallings, SSL: Foundation for Web Security, INTERNET PROTOCOL J., June 1998, at 20,
available at http://www.cisco.com/web/about/ac123/ac147/archived_issues/ipj_1-1/ipj_1-1.pdf.
Similarly, the invention and widespread use of computer network access through wireless
radio technology (WiFi) led to the establishment of encryption protocols to prevent
electronic eavesdropping on open radio channels. See WI-FI ALLIANCE, THE STATE OF WI-FI
SECURITY: WI-FI CERTIFIED WPA2 DELIVERS ADVANCED SECURITY TO HOMES, ENTERPRISES
AND MOBILE DEVICES (2012), available at http://davidhoglund.typepad.com/files/20120229
_state_of_wi-fi_security_09may2012_updated_cert.pdf.
79. In 1993, the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) solicited
public comment on a proposed Escrowed Encryption Standard. See A Proposed Federal
Information Processing Standard for an Escrowed Encryption Standard (EES), 58 Fed. Reg.
40,791, 40,791–93 (Jul. 30, 1993). This initiative was born out of the U.S. government’s fear
of losing the ability to eavesdrop on international communications due to the widespread use
of strong cryptography. See A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor Is the Key: Cryptography,
the Clipper Chip, and the Constitution, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 709, 743 (1995). The EES would
solve this problem for the NSA by requiring all users of cryptography to allow the U.S.
government to keep a copy of their secret encryption key(s) in escrow, so that encrypted
communications could be deciphered by the U.S. government should it become necessary.
Id. at 743–45. Unsurprisingly, the public reaction to the proposed EES was overwhelmingly
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strong cryptography thus remains largely unresolved, and governments have sought
alternative—often covert—methods of swinging the pendulum back to their side.
C. The Details of Encryption (From 30,000 Feet)
Before we progress too much further, I believe it is important to understand
some of the fundamental mathematical principals behind cryptography.
Legislatures and courts often deal with encryption indirectly, through analogy or
metaphor, in an effort to show that since encryption is similar in some respects to
some other, better known, or easier to understand, technology, it should be treated
similarly under the law.80 As noted above, cryptography can hardly be described as
a new technology, and yet, due in large part to the arcane mathematics involved and
its relatively late appearance as a commonly available technology, courts and
commentators have struggled to find a model of understanding that truly fits.81
These metaphors are hit-and-miss, sometimes succeeding in capturing one aspect of

negative, despite the Clinton administration’s full-court marketing press. See DIFFIE
& LANDAU, supra note 48, at 212; Froomkin, supra, at 744. Despite these protests, NIST
adopted the EES on Feb. 9, 1994. See Approval of Federal Information Processing Standards
Publication 185, Escrowed Encryption Standard (EES), 59 Fed. Reg. 5997, 5997–98 (Feb. 9,
1994). After a vulnerability in the EES implementation was found, the already tepid
acceptance by the industry fell even further, causing EES to fade into obscurity. See
generally Matt Blaze, Key Escrow from a Safe Distance: Looking Back at the Clipper Chip,
27 PROC. ANN. COMPUTER SECURITY APPLICATIONS CONF. 317 (2011), available at
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2076777; Matt Blaze, Protocol Failure in the Escrowed
Encryption Standard, 2 PROC. ACM CONF. ON COMPUTER & COMM. SECURITY 59 (1994),
available at http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=191193.
80. This analogical approach is not unique to encryption, of course, as reasoning by
analogy is one of the most familiar forms of legal reasoning. Cass R. Sunstein, On
Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741, 741 (1993); see also EDWARD H. LEVI, AN
INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 10–15 (1949). This approach has had some success
with certain technologies, such as railroads, that bear enough of a resemblance to their
analogical cousins to fit existing models of thought. See Vincent M. Brannigan,
Biotechnology: A First Order Technico-Legal Revolution, 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 545, 549
(1988) (observing that certain technologies do not require any changes to legal thought,
whereas others required fundamental changes). Other, more disruptive, technologies have
required more significant changes to existing schools of thought. Air travel, for example,
represented an order of magnitude change in technology and required significant changes in
the law to address such novel issues as trespass by air. See Hinman v. Pac. Air Transp., 84
F.2d 755, 759 (9th Cir. 1936) (allowing airplanes the right to fly over private property).
81. See, e.g., 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 (2013) (cryptography as a “device” and “munition”); A.
Michael Froomkin, The Constitution and Encryption Regulation: Do We Need a “New
Privacy”?, 3 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 25, 26 (2000) (encrypted speech is a language);
Froomkin, supra note 79, at 871 (“A cipher is armor around a communication much like a safe
is armor around a possession.”); David Hricik, Lawyers Worry Too Much About Transmitting
Client Confidences by Internet E-Mail, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 459, 493 (1998) (“Encryption
is an electronic ‘lock-and-key’ technology . . . .”); Ronald L. Rivest, The Case Against
Regulating Encryption Technology, SCI. AM., Oct. 1998, at 116, 116−17 (encryption
technology as gloves to hide fingerprints); Lee Tien, Publishing Software as a Speech Act, 15
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 629, 672 (2000) (encryption as envelope containing the message).
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cryptography, but often falling short in others.82 The problem with attempting to
understand the use of cryptography solely through imperfect models of the concept
is that these models can quickly outlive their usefulness, transforming from tools
that assist our initial understanding into intellectual crutches that oversimplify
critical issues.83 In this Article, I will therefore endeavor to avoid unnecessary
metaphors wherever possible. In order to start from a solid foundation, it is
necessary to truly understand the basic elements of cryptography and its uses.
The act of transforming a message (plaintext or cleartext) into an enciphered
form (ciphertext) in such a way as to hide its substance is called encryption.84 The
operations that transform plaintext to ciphertext, and from ciphertext back to
plaintext, are forms of mathematical functions.85 More precisely, if a particular
function transforms plaintext to ciphertext, then the function that transforms that
ciphertext back to plaintext is the original function’s inverse.86 Successful

82. Courts and commentators are not blind to this issue, of course, but it has been noted
that courts are often unprepared when trying to apply existing law to new technologies:
“[a]nalogy is the only real road map for courts when technological change leaves them in
unknown legal territory,” where the technology does “not fit neatly into existing categories.”
Linda Greenhouse, What Level of Protection for Internet Speech?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24,
1997, at D5. Analogy and metaphor are useful tools to begin one’s understanding of an
abstract concept. As Max Black wrote,
Why stretch and twist, press and expand, concepts in this way—Why try to see
A as metaphorically B, when it literally is not B? . . . [B]ecause we often need to
do so, the available literal resources of the language being insufficient to
express our sense of the rich correspondences, interrelations, and analogies of
domains conventionally separated; and because metaphorical thought and
utterance sometimes embody insight expressible in no other fashion.
Max Black, More About Metaphor, in METAPHOR AND THOUGHT 19, 33 (Andrew Ortony ed.,
2d ed. 1993).
83. Linguists, logicians, and philosophers have long been wary of the potential abuses
of metaphor. The philosopher Max Black has stated that “[t]o draw attention to a
philosopher’s metaphors is to belittle him—like praising a logician for his beautiful
handwriting. Addiction to metaphor is held to be illicit, on the principle that whereof one can
speak only metaphorically, thereof one ought not to speak at all.” Max Black, Metaphor, 55
PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 273, 273 (1955).
84. SCHNEIER, supra note 69, at 1. It should be noted that message privacy or
confidentiality is but one of the goals of a cryptographic system. Other objectives include data
integrity (the prevention and detection of unwanted data manipulation), authentication (the
identification of sender and recipient), and nonrepudiation (the prevention of entities from
denying previous commitments or actions). See ALFRED J. MENEZES, PAUL C. VAN OORSCHOT
& SCOTT A. VANSTONE, HANDBOOK OF APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY 4 (1997). A full examination
of these fundamental goals of cryptography is beyond the scope of this Article, and for the
purposes of this argument I will focus—somewhat superficially—on the goal of message
confidentiality. I will strive mightily to keep the mathematics in this Article to a minimum.
85. See MENEZES ET AL., supra note 84, at 6–8.
86. See id. at 7–8. In order to uphold my promise to keep the mathematics to a minimum
in this Article, I have glossed over a number of important mathematical principles necessary
for these functions to operate as advertised. For example, in order for a plaintext message to
be properly recovered, the encryption function and its inverse must both be special kinds of
functions known as bijections. While this distinction is crucial to the mathematics behind
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cryptosystems depend on special kinds of functions known as one-way functions
and trapdoor functions.87 A one-way function is a function that is easy to compute
but whose inverse is “computationally infeasible” to calculate.88 A trapdoor
function is a one-way function with an additional property that contains
information (the trapdoor function’s “secret”) that makes it computationally
feasible to find its inverse.89 For the purposes of this Article, one can consider
encryption as a trapdoor function and decryption as that trapdoor function’s
inverse. That is, if Alice uses a trapdoor function to encrypt a message to Bob, it
would be computationally difficult for anyone who is not privy to the “secret” of
the trapdoor function—we can call this the key—to decrypt the resulting ciphertext
via the inverse of Alice’s trapdoor function.
The viability of modern computational cryptography therefore depends quite
heavily on what is “computationally infeasible.” That is, mathematicians have not
been able to prove with certainty that any true one-way functions exist.90 Since the
existence of true one-way functions is unknown, the existence of true trapdoor
functions is therefore also unknown.91 One does not have to be a mathematician to
realize that this poses something of a problem for cryptography in general and the
long-term secrecy of existing encrypted communications in particular. But while
there may come a day when a method to easily invert one-way functions is
discovered, thus pulling the rug out from under much of modern cryptography,
mathematicians and cryptographers currently agree that that day has not yet
arrived.92 For the time being, the continued viability of modern computational
cryptographic techniques depends on the “computational infeasibility” of finding
the inverses of trapdoor functions through “brute force” methods on current (and
foreseeable) technologies.93
cryptography, it is not as important for the purposes of this Article. For those interested in a
more complete description, see generally id.
87. See id. at 8–9.
88. Id. at 8. A common example of a one-way function is one which takes two very large
prime numbers, p and q, and multiplies them to get a new number n, which, by definition, is
divisible by 1, p, and q only. The number n is known as a semiprime number. Finding the
number n is relatively easy, but if p and q are sufficiently large prime numbers, finding the
factors p and q of n is computationally difficult, even with today’s most powerful computers.
89. Id. at 9. Building upon the example in note 88, supra, a trapdoor function would provide
the additional information of either p or q, thus making the factorization of n much easier.
90. Id.; see also Jacob Ziv, In Search of a One-Way Function, in OPEN PROBLEMS IN
COMMUNICATION AND COMPUTATION 104–05 (Thomas M. Cover & B. Gopinath eds., 1987).
91. MENEZES ET AL., supra note 84, at 9.
92. See Ziv, supra note 90, at 104–05. In fact, the finding of an easy solution to one-way
functions is linked to the “P vs. NP” problem, one of the great unsolved problems in
mathematics. Finding a solution to the “P vs. NP” problem would have a seismic impact on
the world of mathematics far beyond the area of cryptography. See STEPHEN COOK, THE P
VERSUS NP PROBLEM, available at http://www.claymath.org/sites/default/files/pvsnp.pdf. I
address this lurking problem and its implications more fully in Part II.A, infra.
93. By “brute force” methods, I mean cryptanalytic attacks that attempt to decrypt an
enciphered message by trying every possible decryption key until either the message is
decrypted or all possible keys have been exhausted. See CHRISTOF PAAR & JAN PELZL,
UNDERSTANDING CRYPTOGRAPHY: A TEXTBOOK FOR STUDENTS AND PRACTITIONERS 7 (2010).
Such direct attacks on well-established and vetted encryption techniques are very rarely the
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D. Who Uses Encryption?
Even at the high levels of abstraction I’ve adopted in presenting the basics of
cryptography above, it quickly becomes apparent that the mathematical principles
behind cryptography are astoundingly complex and are best understood by—and
left to—experts in the field. Fortunately for the rest of us, a great deal of progress
has been made over the past few decades to make strong cryptography a generally
available reality through (somewhat) user-accessible computer software.94 The
explosive growth of Internet use in the 1990s yielded a storm of commercial
cryptographic systems, some of it good, but much of it bad.95 In fact, the
commercial appeal of making easy money by building a cryptographic system and
selling it to worried customers as a security panacea led many security experts to
warn the public to watch out for cryptographic “snake oil.”96
approach of those who make it their business to read the secret messages of others. Rather, it is
generally much more fruitful to seek out gaps in the armor to exploit, which can take the form
of implementation mistakes, poorly chosen cryptographic keys, and old-fashioned human
weakness. See, e.g., Michael Eisen, What Exactly Are the NSA’s ‘Groundbreaking
Cryptanalytic Capabilities’?, WIRED (Sept. 4, 2013, 9:29 AM), http://www.wired.com
/opinion/2013/09/black-budget-what-exactly-are-the-nsas-cryptanalytic-capabilities/ (examining
possible theories behind NSA cryptanalytic capabilities); Dan Goodin, Private Crypto Key in
Mission-Critical Hardware Menaces Electric Grids, ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 22, 2012, 12:36
PM), http://arstechnica.com/security/2012/08/mission-critical-hardware-flaw/ (reporting on
poor cryptographic engineering resulting in a widespread vulnerability); Matthew Green, Is the
Cryptopocalypse Nigh?, FEW THOUGHTS ON CRYPTOGRAPHIC ENGINEERING (Aug. 19, 2013,
12:43 PM), http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/08/is-cryptopocalypse-nigh.html
(showing that recent demonstrated attacks only apply to a small subset of cryptographic keys);
Green, Many Flaws, supra note 71 (providing analysis of flaws in a cryptographic random
number generator allegedly sabotaged by NSA); Micah F. Lee, No Really, the NSA Can’t Brute
Force Your Crypto, MICAH LEE’S BLOG (Jan. 23, 2013, 7:11 PM),
https://micahflee.com/2013/01/no-really-the-nsa-cant-break-your-crypto/ (demonstrating the
computational infeasibility of brute force attacks on cryptographic keys using current
technologies); The NSA’s Crypto “Breakthrough,” ECONOMIST (Sept. 2, 2013, 3:00 PM),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/babbage/2013/09/breaking-cryptography (observing that the
most likely answer to revelations of NSA decryption program question is the exploitation of
bugs in cryptographic protocols).
94. Due to the high degree of expertise and sheer computational horsepower required,
strong cryptography has long been the sole domain of governments and militaries. See LEVY,
supra note 75, at 13–15; DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 48, at 49–59. In the early 1970s,
however, a number of key research breakthroughs coincided with the rise of relatively cheap
and powerful computers, initiating a cryptography renaissance. DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra
note 48, at 59–63.
95. Most cryptographers will tell you that “cryptography is very difficult” but
“[c]ryptography is the easy part” of cryptographic engineering. FERGUSON ET AL., supra note
69, at 12–14.
96. The term itself is derived from a type of patent medicine called “snake oil” that was
widely available during the nineteenth century. As applied, modern vendors of cryptographic
snake oil were those selling a cryptographic product considered by experts to be bogus or
flawed. See ZIMMERMANN, supra note 71, at 39–43; Matt Curtin, Snake Oil Warning Signs:
Encryption Software To Avoid, INTERHACK RES. (Apr. 10, 1998), http://www.interhack.net
/people/cmcurtin/snake-oil-faq.html; Bruce Schneier, Snake Oil, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY
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The commodification of the computer and the proliferation of near
instantaneous electronic global communication has driven governments,
businesses, and (to a somewhat lesser extent) individuals to make a special effort to
keep their communications private.97 As noted earlier, this privacy interest is not a
new concept. But unlike the historical examples of messages conveyed via stone,
papyrus, paper, telegraph, or radio broadcast, the existence of a nearly ubiquitous
data communication infrastructure has forced a reexamination and rebirth of
communication and data security principles and practices. The complexity of
modern communication protocols means that cryptography is only one element of a
broader communications-security regime. An encryption mechanism by itself may
be interesting for academic reasons, but it is fairly useless apart from a larger
security system.98 The details behind this design philosophy are beyond the scope
of this Article. For our purposes, I only note that, while cryptography is a critical
part of any communications-security mechanism, it is generally not the piece of the
security system that is the first to fail.99
Despite the overall complexities and difficulties in engineering strong
cryptographic systems, these systems have become essential components of the
modern Internet.100 To date, most uses of encryption technologies remain largely
invisible to the average Internet user. At best, this means that encryption is simply
ignored; at worst, it gives users a false sense of security in poorly understood
technologies.101 But growing popular awareness of computer security issues
generally, and cryptography’s role in data protection specifically, has ignited a
broad awakening of interest in, and use of, encryption technologies.102 And while

(Feb. 15, 1999), https://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-9902.html#snakeoil. Some of the
more common signs of such snake oil are claims of “security through obscurity,” that is,
claiming that the system must be kept secret; the use of “technobabble”; and blanket claims
that the cryptographic system in question is “unbreakable.” Curtin, supra.
97. See DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 48, at 59–61.
98. See FERGUSON ET AL., supra note 69, at 4.
99. Like any complex system, the weaknesses of communication-security protocols are
most often found in the joints between their subsystems. See id. at 4–5 (discussing the
“weakest link” approach to security-system analysis); see also DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note
48, at 38–40.
100. Without the availability of strong cryptographic systems, our current systems of
global finance, commerce, medicine, and government would likely face dire consequences,
and may fail altogether. See Cracked Credibility, ECONOMIST, Sept. 14, 2013, at 65.
101. While it is true that both commercial and open source cryptographic applications
can be found in some form in nearly every network-enabled technology today, their use is
often limited to whatever default settings were installed with the application. This approach
is designed with user convenience in mind, adhering to the unfortunately common principle
that the more secure you make something, the less secure it becomes. This is cute shorthand
for the phenomenon where users will often find (insecure) shortcuts around application
security that gets in their way. See Donold A. Norman, When Security Gets in the Way,
INTERACTIONS, Nov.−Dec. 2009, at 60.
102. Interestingly enough, the trend toward increased user education in cryptography and
other computer-security basics has been encouraged by the U.S. government. For example,
since 2004, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security has sponsored “National Cyber
Security Awareness Month” each October, marking the occasion each year by providing
security tips, including recommendations to encrypt files. See, e.g., National Cyber Security

2015]

FURTIVE ENCRYPTION

121

truly ubiquitous encryption is not yet a reality, a growing number of individuals,
businesses, and other organizations have taken steps to keep their messages and
data secret by encrypting their contents.103
E. Why Does Encryption Matter?
Cryptographers generally agree that strong cryptography, implemented and used
properly, poses a significant, and often realistically insurmountable, obstacle to
would-be eavesdroppers, even those with access to nearly unlimited resources like
the NSA.104 One problem with this assumption, however, is the fact that it is not
very “future proof.” That is to say, the known theory, techniques, and computing
power of today will most likely be viewed as quaint in the not-too-distant future, if
recent progress is any indication, and what is thought of as computationally
infeasible today may very well be child’s play in several decades (or fewer).105
To illustrate how technological and theoretical improvements can affect the
future security of messages encrypted using today’s standards, we can look to
cryptographic key length.106 As late as 2005, a 1024-bit RSA public key was
considered by standards organizations to provide adequate security for the

Awareness Month 2014, DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY (Oct. 2, 2014), http://www.dhs.gov
/national-cyber-security-awareness-month; Security Tip (ST05-017): Cybersecurity for
Electronic Devices, US-CERT (Feb. 6, 2013), https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/tips/st05-017.
103. Of course, there are perfectly legitimate reasons, both technical and personal, that may
influence an individual’s or organization’s decision to keep some data freely accessible and
readable. In fact, some computer-security experts have warned that the ubiquitous encryption of
all Internet traffic would hinder the ability to detect viruses and other malware as it is shared
over networks. See, e.g., Rob Holquist, Growing Network-Encryption Use Puts Systems at
Risk, IEEE COMPUTING NOW (Aug. 2011), http://www.computer.org/portal/web/computingnow
/news/growing-network-encryption-use-puts-systems-at-risk (discussing how network
encryption protocols widely used in the Internet could be used to hide malicious activity). I do
not address these issues in this Article but instead focus on the warrantless government search
and seizure of all encrypted data and its legal and societal implications.
104. Questions of flawed implementations aside, the strength of a cryptographic scheme
is not achieved through the secrecy of the scheme itself (see the discussion of Kerckhoff’s
Principle in supra note 69) but through the mathematical soundness of the underlying
algorithm along with other factors such as the chosen lengths of the cryptographic keys. See
SCHNEIER, supra note 69, at 166–67.
105. Following an observed trend in technology that has continued for over fifty years, it
is estimated that the efficiency of computing equipment divided by price doubles every
eighteen months and increases by a factor of ten every five years. Id. at 167. If this
conjecture—known as Moore’s Law, named for Intel cofounder Gordon Moore who first
described this trend—continues to hold true, the fastest computers in fifty years will be 1010,
or ten billion, times faster than the computers of today.
106. The size of the keys used in cryptographic systems is often used as a shorthand
measure of cryptographic strength. While this is not a perfect or complete measurement, key
length does provide an indication as to the degree of security a particular key will provide
within a given cryptographic system. See MATT BLAZE, WHITFIELD DIFFIE, RONALD L.
RIVEST, BRUCE SCHNEIER, TSUTOMU SHIMOMURA, ERIC THOMPSON & MICHAEL WIENER,
MINIMAL KEY LENGTHS FOR SYMMETRIC CIPHERS TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE COMMERCIAL
SECURITY (1996), available at http://people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/bsa-final-report.pdf.
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protection of sensitive information through 2015.107 That is, a stored message
encrypted using a properly implemented RSA cryptographic algorithm and a
1024-bit key could safely be considered unbreakable—or at least computationally
infeasible to break—through 2015. But in May 2007, a group of researchers used a
networked array of four hundred computers to factor a 1039-bit number in eleven
months.108 While the number the researchers factored was not a true RSA
number,109 it was close enough that cryptographers warned users of the RSA
cryptographic system not to use keys of size 1024-bit and smaller.110 Thus, even the
most pessimistic of cryptographers, armed with years of empirical research, could
not accurately predict a combination of improvements in research and computing
power (along with the ever-present and completely unpredictable factor of human
ingenuity) that would diminish the future viability of a key size by years.111
The limited shelf life of cryptographic keys, and by extension the messages
encrypted with those keys, becomes highly significant when we consider the
implications of a secret NSA program to collect—and store indefinitely—all
encrypted messages sent by U.S. citizens. Cryptography and mathematics
researchers worldwide spend countless hours creating, analyzing, and attempting to
break cryptographic systems, a time-honored and open process that serves as the

107. J. SCHAAD, B. KALISKI & R. HOUSLEY, ADDITIONAL ALGORITHMS AND IDENTIFIERS
RSA CRYPTOGRAPHY FOR USE IN THE INTERNET X.509 PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE
CERTIFICATE AND CERTIFICATE REVOCATION LIST (CRL) PROFILE, at 23, (2005), available at
http://tools.ietf.org/pdf/rfc4055.pdf. Key length is measured in bits, which is the most basic
unit of information in computing, having only two possible values, 0 or 1. A 1024-bit RSA
key is a very large number which has over three hundred decimal digits and which is the
product of two smaller (but still quite large) prime numbers. As noted in Part I.C, supra, the
security of the RSA cryptographic system, and others like it, depends on the computational
infeasibility of factoring a very large number which is the product of two large prime
numbers. Advances in techniques and computing power thus effectively erode a key’s
cryptographic value over time. See M.J.B. ROBSHAW, SECURITY ESTIMATES FOR 512-BIT RSA
(1995), available at http://www.networkdls.com/Articles/security_estimates.pdf.
108. See Jacqui Cheng, Researchers: 307-Digit Key Crack Endangers 1024-bit RSA, ARS
TECHNICA (May 23, 2007, 6:37 PM), http://arstechnica.com/uncategorized/2007/05
/researchers-307-digit-key-crack-endangers-1024-bit-rsa/.
109. Beginning in 1991, RSA Laboratories published a series of large semiprime
numbers—known as RSA numbers—as a challenge to researchers to find the two prime factors
of each RSA number. See RSA Labs., The RSA Factoring Challenge FAQ, EMC2,
http://www.emc.com/emc-plus/rsa-labs/historical/the-rsa-factoring-challenge-faq.htm; see also
RSA Number, WOLFRAM MATHWORLD, http://mathworld.wolfram.com/RSANumber.html.
Though it is no longer active, the RSA Factoring Challenge was meant to encourage
cryptographic research, as well as to provide a “coal mine canary” to warn researchers when
certain key sizes were no longer to be considered cryptographically safe. RSA Labs., supra.
110. See Cheng, supra note 108.
111. The list of unimaginably large semiprime numbers which have since been factored
continues to grow. For example, a Mersenne Prime (prime numbers which take the form
2p – 1, where p is prime) of size 21061 – 1, a number with 320 decimal digits, was factored
between early 2011 and August 2012. See GREG CHILDERS, FACTORIZATION OF A 1061-BIT
NUMBER BY THE SPECIAL NUMBER FIELD SIEVE (2012), available at http://eprint.iacr.org
/2012/444.pdf.
FOR
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only acceptable proving (and disproving) grounds for strong cryptography.112 It is
therefore not entirely surprising when cryptographic systems are broken, even those
designed by recognized experts in the field and in use for years.113 This fact is not
lost on the NSA, which employs thousands of mathematicians, many of whom hold
PhDs in the field, to research ways to make and break cryptographic systems.114 By
collecting and storing encrypted messages for indefinite periods of time, the NSA
has asserted its own authority to eventually decrypt every such message, regardless
of its origin or intent.
In fact, the Snowden documents have shown that, over the past decade, the NSA
has increased its efforts to find ways to break cryptographic systems.115 While
some have interpreted these NSA documents to mean that the agency has “cracked
much of the encryption” available on the web,116 most cryptography experts are of
the opinion that, in most cases, the NSA is not attacking the cryptographic
protocols themselves, since these still pose mathematically intractable problems,
but is rather attacking weaknesses in their implementations.117 More disturbing to

112. As described in Part I.C, supra, cryptography is an arcane and difficult discipline,
and there is no known way to design, implement, and vet systems strong enough to
withstand known attacks other than through continual research and testing by the
cryptography research community. See FERGUSON ET AL., supra note 69, at 13.
113. See id. An example of a widely used and trusted cryptographic system later found to
be fatally flawed is the MD5 message digest algorithm. MD5 is an example of a
cryptographic hash function, which takes an arbitrary block of data and returns a fixed-size
string (a cryptographic hash value) with the following properties: (1) it is easy to compute
the hash value from any given message, (2) it is infeasible to generate a message that has a
given hash value, (3) it is infeasible to modify a message without changing the resulting hash
value, and (4) it is infeasible to find two different messages with the same hash value. See
SCHNEIER, supra note 69, at 429–36. MD5 was designed by Ron Rivest (the “R” in RSA) in
1992 to replace the flawed MD4. See R. Rivest, The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm,
IETF.ORG (April 1992), http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1321.txt. In 1996, however, a flaw in
MD5 was discovered by researchers who demonstrated that MD5 failed property (4) above.
See XIAOYUN WANG & HONGBU YU, HOW TO BREAK MD5 AND OTHER HASH FUNCTIONS,
available at http://merlot.usc.edu/csac-f06/papers/Wang05a.pdf. MD5 has since been
considered unsuitable for strong cryptographic applications. See Marc Stevens, Arjen K.
Lenstra & Benne de Weger, Vulnerability of Software Integrity and Code Signing
Applications to Chosen-Prefix Collisions for MD5, EINDHOVEN U. TECH. (Jan. 1, 2009),
http://www.win.tue.nl/hashclash/SoftIntCodeSign/.
114. See Critical Skills for National Security and the Homeland Security Federal
Workforce Act: Hearing on S. 1800 Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Sec., Proliferation & Fed.
Servs. of the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong. 11 (2002) (statement of
Harvey A. Davis, Associate Director, Human Resources Services, National Security
Agency); see also Siobhan Gorman, Intelligence Chiefs: Shutdown Threatening National
Security, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 2, 2013, 12:33 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2013/10/02
/intelligence-chiefs-shutdown-threatening-national-security/.
115. See Perlroth et al., supra note 71.
116. Id.
117. See, e.g., Bruce Schneier, NSA Surveillance: A Guide to Staying Secure, GUARDIAN,
(Sept. 6, 2013, 9:09 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-how-to-remain
-secure-surveillance. Cryptographers are well aware of the “weakest link property,” which can
be summarized by the principle that a cryptographic system is only as strong as its weakest
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the cryptographic community, however, is the discovery of NSA manipulation of
cryptographic standards and commercial cryptographic systems in order to provide
“back doors” to easily decrypt messages without the proper key.118 These
manipulations not only weaken defenses against malicious Internet activities but
also directly threaten the trust that must exist between a government and its
citizens. This trust is a constitutional value even more fundamental to Fourth
Amendment principles than is privacy, and it should be a guide to the Fourth
Amendment analysis of the NSA’s broad collection of encrypted messages.119
II. PRIVACY, POWER, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR PERFECT SECURITY
A. The Development of Current Fourth Amendment Doctrine
The lineage of today’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence can be traced directly
back to the Supreme Court’s decision in Olmstead v. United States.120 In Olmstead,
the Court considered whether the warrantless wiretapping of a telephone line
violated the Fourth Amendment.121 The majority held that the defendants’ Fourth
Amendment rights were not violated by this warrantless wiretapping, stating that
“[t]he [Fourth] Amendment . . . shows that the search is to be of material things—
the person, the house, his papers or his effects.”122 Since government wiretapping

link. See FERGUSON ET AL., supra note 69, at 3–5. Simply put, the strongest cryptographic
protocols are worthless if the system implementing the protocols provides opportunities to read
secret messages without actually finding a mathematical shortcut to decryption.
118. In addition to “partnerships with major telecommunications carriers to shape the
global network to benefit other collection accesses,” the NSA has been “‘actively engag[ing]
the U.S. and foreign IT industries to covertly influence and/or overtly leverage their
commercial products’ designs’ to make them ‘exploitable.’” Perlroth, supra note 71. In other
words, the NSA has been working with technology companies to provide hidden back doors
by “insert[ing] vulnerabilities into commercial encryption systems, IT systems, networks,
and endpoint communications devices used by targets.” See Secret Documents Reveal N.S.A.
Campaign Against Encryption, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com
/interactive/2013/09/05/us/documents-reveal-nsa-campaign-against-encryption.html.
Cryptographers, mathematical researchers, and other scientists have been especially
alarmed by the NSA’s efforts to “[i]nfluence policies, standards and specifications for
commercial public key technologies.” Perlroth, supra note 71. Mathematicians have recently
confirmed that an important cryptographic standard published by NIST was artificially
weakened through secret NSA manipulation. See Green, Many Flaws, supra note 71. This has
been a suspected flaw since mathematicians aired their suspicions in 2007. See Bruce Schneier,
Did NSA Put a Secret Backdoor in New Encryption Standard?, WIRED, (Nov. 15, 2007),
http://archive.wired.com/politics/security/commentary/securitymatters/2007/11/securitymatters
_1115. Researchers and commercial entities rely on standards bodies to provide unbiased
advice as to which cryptographic protocols and algorithms will provide the most robust
protection. To subvert or corrupt this process quickly dissolves the trust relationships necessary
for a democratic and free market society to thrive, and we have already begun to see its effects.
See Goodin, supra note 71. I will explore this issue in more detail in Part II, infra.
119. See infra Part IV.
120. 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled in part by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
121. Id. at 455.
122. Id. at 464.

2015]

FURTIVE ENCRYPTION

125

required neither “physical invasion” nor the seizure of “tangible material effects,” it
was not a search under the Fourth Amendment.123
It was Justice Brandeis’s famous dissent in Olmstead, however, that set the stage
for the Court’s later Fourth Amendment doctrine. Justice Brandeis criticized the
majority’s narrow, property-based interpretation of the Fourth Amendment,
warning of the effects that advances in technology would have under this
doctrine.124 In particular, he stated that “general limitations on the powers of
Government . . . do not forbid the United States or the States from meeting modern
conditions by regulations which ‘a century ago, or even half century ago, probably
would have been rejected as arbitrary or oppressive.’”125
The criticisms Justice Brandeis laid out in his dissent placed a Fourth
Amendment emphasis on protecting citizens’ privacy from unwarranted
government intrusion, noting that the Founders “knew that only a part of the pain,
pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things” and that “[t]o
protect [Fourth Amendment rights], every unjustifiable intrusion by the
Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed,
must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.”126 His dissent in Olmstead
continues to influence the Court even today.127
By the 1960s, the Court began to move away from the property-based, trespass
theory of the Fourth Amendment found in Olmstead, leading to its complete
rejection in Katz v. United States.128 In Katz, government agents installed a
microphone in a telephone booth knowing the defendant used it to discuss illegal
gambling operations.129 The Court addressed the question of whether the evidence
gathered by the agents in their warrantless eavesdropping had been obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment.130 The Katz Court rejected the property-based
approach of Olmstead, stating that property and trespass did not control the
government’s ability to conduct Fourth Amendment searches.131
The rejection of the Fourth Amendment doctrine articulated in Olmstead
provided the Katz Court with the foundation upon which it created what is now
known as the “reasonable expectation of privacy test.”132 This test has its origins in
Justice Harlan’s concurrence, where he stated that his “understanding of the rule
that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement [for a

123. Id. at 466.
124. See Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General
Approach, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1024 (2010).
125. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 472 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (quoting Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926)).
126. Id. at 478.
127. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 959 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (citing Justice Brandeis’s Olmstead dissent in her criticism of a property-based
Fourth Amendment doctrine); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961) (citing Justice
Brandeis’s Olmstead dissent to support application of the exclusionary rule to the states).
128. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
129. Id. at 348.
130. Id. at 348−50.
131. Id. at 353.
132. See infra note 134 and accompanying text.
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Fourth Amendment search], first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”133
B. The Twin Problems of Reasonableness and Perspective
in Fourth Amendment Analysis
Modern Fourth Amendment doctrine is a direct result of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Katz and the Court’s first articulation of a “reasonable expectation of
privacy” test for Fourth Amendment protection.134 The majority in Katz declared
that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,”135 and along with Justice
Harlan’s concurring opinion, established a privacy-based analysis for searches
within the amendment.136 By introducing the concept of privacy into its Fourth
Amendment analysis, the Court, perhaps inadvertently, opened the door for later
courts to redefine Fourth Amendment protections by using the concept to decide
whether a government intrusion was reasonable under the amendment.
What ultimately became a reasonableness-balancing test arose out of the Court’s
decisions in Camara v. Municipal Court137 and Terry v. Ohio.138 The jurisprudence
that emerged from these cases balanced an individual’s reasonable expectation of
privacy against the needs or interest of the government.139 This balancing test
created a sort of reasonableness ratio, where warrants were ultimately evaluated
based on the weight of the government’s need for the intrusion, and opened the
door for a smorgasbord of government intrusions that lacked any sort of
individualized probable cause under traditional Fourth Amendment analysis but
which the Court could find “reasonable” in the balance. The doctrinal deck has
been stacked: how can mere privacy compete with the fundamental importance of
the fight against global terrorism, the War on Drugs, or our children’s safety?
Post-Katz opinions are replete with the Court’s recognition of the “special
needs” of the government, which thus outweigh the individual’s argument under

133. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
134. While the phrase “reasonable expectation of privacy” only appeared in Justice
Harlan’s concurring opinion in Katz, id. at 360, it has since become the standard description
of the Katz test. Id. (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Scott E. Sundby, “Everyman’s” Fourth
Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 1751, 1756 (1994).
135. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (majority opinion).
136. Smith v. Maryland , 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (“Consistently with Katz, this Court
uniformly has held that the application of the Fourth Amendment depends on whether the
person invoking its protection can claim a justifiable, a reasonable, or a legitimate
expectation of privacy that has been invaded by a government action.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)). For an excellent discussion of Fourth Amendment doctrine post-Katz, see
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349 (1974).
137. 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (applying Fourth Amendment doctrine to housing inspections based
on balancing the needs of government against the individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy).
138. 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (applying Fourth Amendment doctrine to police “stop-and-frisk”
procedures based on reasonable suspicion that the individual was armed).
139. See Sundby, supra note 134, at 1769–70; cf. Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment
Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476, 487–89 (2011).
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the balancing test.140 This special needs doctrine grew out of the Supreme Court’s
recognition of the unique issues arising from administrative searches and the
Court’s attempts to carve out exceptions to traditional Fourth Amendment
requirements for these civil searches.141 Prior to the Court’s decision in Camara,
administrative and civil searches were not subject to Fourth Amendment
requirements.142 In Camara, however, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment’s
warrant clause should also apply to administrative searches, albeit in a somewhat
more limited context.143
The Court more fully articulated what is now known as the “special needs”
doctrine in New Jersey v. T.L.O., where a high school administrator searched a
purse belonging to a student he suspected of smoking in the school.144 The school
administrator had neither a warrant nor probable cause to conduct the search, but
the Court allowed it based on two factors: first, the administrator’s search was
conducted for the purpose of “maintaining discipline in the classroom and on
school grounds” and not for the purpose of law enforcement;145 second, high school
students have a “lesser expectation of privacy” than citizens in general.146 Justice
Blackmun’s concurrence in the judgment laid out a test wherein the special needs
doctrine was permitted “[o]nly in those exceptional circumstances in which special
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and
probable-cause requirement impracticable.”147
The “War on Terror” that followed the catastrophic events of September 11, 2001,
increased the frequency of suspicionless searches by law enforcement, including
contexts such as searches at entrances to subways, on ferries, near political
conventions, near sports arenas, at protest rallies, and around water reservoirs.148
In particular, the genuine problem of global terrorism and the government’s duty
to provide for national security have added even more momentum to the courts’
consistent trend toward analyzing Fourth Amendment problems from the

140. See, e.g., Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668 (1989)
(“[Illegal drugs are] one of the greatest problems affecting the health and welfare of our
population.”); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n., 489 U.S. 602, 607 (1989) (observing
fatalities, injuries, and damages from train accidents where alcohol or drugs were the cause);
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339 (1985) (“Maintaining order in the classroom has
never been easy, but in recent years, school disorder has often taken particularly ugly forms:
drug use and violent crime in the schools have become major social problems.”).
141. See, e.g., Camara, 387 U.S. at 530 (administrative searches related to health and
public safety, such as enforcement of housing codes, often require suspicionless searches not
easily conducted under traditional Fourth Amendment requirements).
142. See id.
143. Id. at 534. The Court recognized that although the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment applied to administrative searches, the requirement was met without having to
reach the level of probable cause required for searches relating to criminal matters.
144. 469 U.S. at 328; see also Ric Simmons, Searching for Terrorists: Why Public Safety
Is Not a Special Need, 59 DUKE L.J. 843, 863–65 (2010).
145. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339.
146. Id. at 348 (Powell, J., concurring).
147. Id. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
148. See Simmons, supra note 144, at 873−84.
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government’s point of view.149 This is not to say that courts routinely adopt the
government’s arguments in Fourth Amendment cases, but rather that over the past
three decades, the Supreme Court has been formulating Fourth Amendment doctrine
from the perspective of the government or police agency engaged in searches or
seizures.150 This is contrary to the Court’s orientation toward the individual in Katz
and turns Fourth Amendment doctrine on its head; the Fourth Amendment was
designed to protect citizens from unjustified and arbitrary government intrusions, not
to facilitate the government’s needs.151 This core constitutional tenet is especially
important when addressing government collective-surveillance programs in the face
of government claims of national security necessity.
Current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has been steadily moving toward
analysis that begins from the government’s perspective, a trend made plain in
post-Katz cases that complain of the burden placed on government by Fourth
Amendment requirements.152 This doctrinal trend has been even more prevalent in
cases argued after September 11, 2001, where the government argues that the needs
of national security require an even freer hand unencumbered by naïve Fourth
Amendment analysis made quaint by the global war on terrorism.153
In Amnesty International USA v. Clapper, for example, the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals denied en banc review of an earlier decision by the court granting
standing to plaintiffs who brought claims of Fourth Amendment violations by the
government. In its decision, the Clapper court accepted, without challenge, the

149. See Sundby, supra note 134, at 1796−97.
150. See id. at 1788−90.
151. Justice Brandeis stated that when deciding Fourth Amendment questions, it is
“immaterial that the [challenged] intrusion was in aid of law enforcement.” Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled in part by Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); see also Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio
and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in
Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1393 (1983).
152. See, e.g., Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 876 (1987) (observing that requiring
probation officers to obtain a warrant before conducting an unrestricted search of a
probationer’s home would “make it more difficult for probation officials to respond quickly
to evidence of misconduct” and would “reduce the deterrent effect that the possibility of
expeditious searches would otherwise create”); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907
(1984) (protesting “the substantial social costs exacted by the exclusionary rule for the
vindication of Fourth Amendment rights”); Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 603 (2d
Cir. 1999) (“[T]here are some [government] agencies outside the realm of criminal law
enforcement where government officials have special needs beyond the normal need for law
enforcement,” and forcing these agencies “to follow ordinary law-enforcement requirements
under the Fourth Amendment would impose intolerable burdens . . . .” (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Willner v. Thornburgh, 928 F.2d 1185, 1188 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“[W]hen the
burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the
search, the Fourth Amendment does not require a warrant.” (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
153. See, e.g., Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 667 F.3d 163, 172 (2d Cir. 2011) (Lynch,
J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc). In 2013, the United States Supreme Court
reversed the Second Circuit’s earlier decision, finding that plaintiffs lacked Article III
standing. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1143 (2013).
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government’s contention that the surveillance programs in question were “fully
consistent with the Fourth Amendment,” and stated in its reasoning that “[i]t is
important to remember what is at stake here . . . because the paramount necessity of
protecting the nation’s security against very real and dangerous external threats
requires the limited additional burden on a discrete category of international
communications imposed by the statute.”154 This general philosophy had been
strongly encouraged by the government, as evidenced by the December 2005
revelation of a secret NSA program to intercept electronic communications
between the United States and foreign countries without warrants or probable
cause.155 The Bush administration acknowledged and defended this warrantless
wiretapping, with the Department of Justice suggesting that there may be other
warrantless eavesdropping beyond what had already been disclosed.156
But this analytical perspective runs counter to the individualistic,
protection-oriented
jurisprudence
of
Katz,
replacing
it
with
a
government-needs-and-interests-based analysis. This has led to an astigmatic view
of the Fourth Amendment’s purpose. An important inflection point in this
post-Katz Fourth Amendment jurisprudence can be found in Terry, which initiated
the Court’s police perspective and introduced a new doctrine of stop and frisk.157
C. Parallels with Stop-and-Frisk Policies
The NSA’s asserted right to collect and keep indefinitely all encrypted
communications from U.S. citizens without a warrant, court order, or any
particularized suspicion, bears some resemblance to the reasoning used to justify
suspicionless stop-and-frisk policies. That is, supporters of the proactive police tool
of stop and frisk based on Terry and its progeny argue that the tool’s effectiveness
at preventing crime is justification enough.158 Stop-and-frisk proponents defend the
program even when it is shown that these stops result in a very low number of
actual arrests or discovery of contraband and often result in abusive police practices
that target certain groups irrespective of a lack of individualized suspicion.159
Through its collective-surveillance program of seizing and storing every encrypted
communication from any U.S. citizen, irrespective of a lack of probable cause or

154. Amnesty Int’l USA, 667 F.3d at 172.
155. See James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1.
156. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY DESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT 5 (2006), available at
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB178/surv39.pdf.
157. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
158. See, e.g., David Rudovsky & Lawrence Rosenthal, Debate, The Constitutionality of
Stop-and-Frisk in New York City, 162 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 117, 125 (2013), available at
http://www.pennlawreview.com/online/162-U-Pa-L-Rev-Online-117.pdf.
159. See, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). In
Floyd, the court found that out of 4.4 million Terry stops conducted by the NYPD between
January 2004 and June 2012, 98.5% of these found no weapon, 86% of these found no
contraband, and 88% resulted in no further law-enforcement action. Id. at 556, 558–59.
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reasonable suspicion, the NSA is similarly arguing that any improvement in national
security—no matter how miniscule—justifies these collective warrantless seizures.160
The use of stop-and-frisk policies by police departments has been found
constitutionally reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.161 In these searches,
police “stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has
a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity ‘may be
afoot,’ even if the officer lacks probable cause.”162 That is, a police officer may
conduct a stop and frisk “when the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that
the person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity.”163 At a
minimum, “[t]he officer [making the stop] . . . must be able to articulate something
more than an ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch.’”164 Reasonable
suspicion therefore requires an individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.165 While
the Supreme Court has recognized certain narrow exceptions to this Fourth
Amendment requirement, the Court has made no such exception for stops and
frisks for the general purpose of controlling crime.166
In its examination of the stop-and-frisk practices of the NYPD, the Floyd court
discussed the police officers’ vague justifications for these stops, among the most
common of which was a person’s “furtive movements.”167 The court stated that if
police officers truly believed that this broad description justifies a stop and frisk,

160. I do not argue that the NSA’s collective-surveillance programs and domestic police
stop-and-frisk policies are perfectly analogous. For example, as illustrated in Floyd, New
York City’s stop-and-frisk program resulted in racially motivated stops applied in a
discriminatory manner. Id. at 660–64. I am not arguing that the NSA’s policies are
discriminatory. In fact, their collective warrantless seizures are quite indiscriminate in
nature, which creates its own set of problems.
161. See, e.g., Terry, 392 U.S. at 30–31.
162. United States v. Swindle, 407 F.3d 562, 566 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v.
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)).
163. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 702 (1983) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 22)).
164. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990) (quoting Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7)).
165. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000) (citing Chandler v.
Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 308 (1997)).
166. See id. at 34, 40 (distinguishing between suspicionless stops at checkpoints “for the
purposes of combating drunk driving and intercepting illegal immigrants,” which are
constitutional, and suspicionless stops at checkpoints that primarily aim to advance “the
general interest in crime control,” which are unconstitutional (quoting Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 648, 659 n.18 (1979))).
167. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). One officer
explained his understanding of “furtive movement” as “a very broad concept” that could
include a person
“changing direction,” “walking in a certain way,” “[a]cting a little suspicious,”
“making a movement that is not regular,” being “very fidgety,” “going in and
out of his pocket,” “going in and out of a location,” “looking back and forth
constantly,” “looking over their shoulder,” “adjusting their hip or their belt,”
“moving in and out of a car too quickly,” “[t]urning a part of their body away
from you,” “[g]rabbing at a certain pocket or something at their waist,” “getting
a little nervous, maybe shaking,” and “stutter[ing].”
Id. (emphasis in original). Under these broad conditions, it appears as if almost any
ordinary activity could be construed as “furtive movement” by the police.
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“then it is no surprise that stops so rarely produce evidence of criminal activity.”168
The court held that the NYPD violated the plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights
under these conditions, stating that “‘[t]he idea of universal suspicion without
individual evidence is what Americans find abhorrent . . . .’”169
A thought experiment is appropriate here. If a program like stop and frisk is
effective in fighting crime—as the City of New York claimed in Floyd—what if,
on this basis alone, the program was not only allowed to continue but expanded to
require suspicionless stops of all citizens, regardless of other circumstances?170 The
Floyd court addressed this point, stating that “[m]any police practices may be
useful for fighting crime—preventive detention or coerced confessions, for
example—but because they are unconstitutional they cannot be used, no matter
how effective. ‘The enshrinement of constitutional rights necessarily takes certain
policy choices off the table.’”171
But constitutionality only addresses a part (albeit an important one) of the
underlying issues. If the City of New York wanted to ensure the complete
effectiveness of its program, it would need to stop, frisk, or question every single
person walking or driving the streets of New York. This is impossible, of course,
since the numbers required to implement such a universal program are beyond even
the NYPD’s current strength.172 Moreover, such a program would introduce an
unacceptable drag on the ordinary business and functions within the city. Finally,
such a universal program would likely have the opposite effect from that intended,
as the increasing friction between the police and those being searched would
ultimately erode order.173 The NYPD tacitly conceded these points in Floyd, when
a police deputy inspector explained that “stopping ‘the right people, [at] the right

168. Id. at 561.
169. Id. at 667 (quoting Charles M. Blow, The Whole System Failed Trayvon Martin,
N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/16/opinion/the-whole-system
-failed.html).
170. In Floyd, the City and the NYPD made repeated claims in testimony and evidence
that their focus in applying the stop-and-frisk program was “on effectiveness, not
constitutionality.” Id. at 593. Examples of this philosophy abound in the city’s arguments
and were applied from the lowest to highest levels within the police department, including
evaluation of whether police officers’ “impact on declared conditions” was “effective.”
Moreover, the Chief of Police put pressure on subordinates by measuring effectiveness
through numbers of stops. See id. at 601–02.
171. Id. at 556 (quoting Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008)). The court
later notes that “[e]ven if it were an effective gang-suppression strategy to stop every person
wearing known gang paraphernalia, it would not be a constitutional strategy, because neither
carrying beads nor flaunting a bandana is a crime.” Id. at 599 n.249 (emphasis in original).
172. “The NYPD’s current uniformed strength is approximately 34,500.” Police Dep’t,
City of N.Y., Frequently Asked Questions, NYC.GOV, http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html
/faq/faq_police.shtml.
173. The Supreme Court recognized this outcome in Terry, stating that “‘[i]n many
communities, field interrogations are a major source of friction between the police and
minority groups,’” and that friction “increases ‘as more police departments [encourage]
officers . . . routinely to stop and question person on the street.’” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
14 n.11 (quoting PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK
FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 183 (1967)).
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time, [in] the right location’ meant not stopping ‘a 48-year-old lady [who] was
walking through St. Mary’s Park when it was closed.’”174
These real world constraints provide a natural brake on police search-and-seizure
abuses that do not necessarily need a court opinion to have an effect. What happens,
however, when technology presents methods of conducting a similar form of
collective, persistent surveillance that avoids these natural constraints? This is the
case that these newly confirmed government surveillance programs have put before
us today, and it is in these cases, where the natural safety nets of limited resources
and public opinion are missing, that constitutional diligence must be at its strongest.
D. The Double-Edged Sword of Technology
The steady advance of communication technology since the nineteenth century
has effectively brought nearly everyone on the planet within earshot of one
another.175 Within a mere two centuries, messages intended for transoceanic
recipients, which would have taken many weeks to reach their destination, can
reach their recipient within a fraction of a second.176 Furthermore, modern modes
of communication are not just available to governments or large commercial
enterprises but to anyone with a cell phone.177 The result has been a virtual
shrinking of our planet and has spurred a flood of global communication and media
that existed solely in the realm of speculative fiction only a few decades ago.178

174. Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 604 (alterations in original).
175. For example, according to the International Telecommunication Union, there were
6.8 billion mobile phone subscriptions worldwide in 2013, which is roughly equivalent to
96% of the global population. INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, THE WORLD IN 2013: ICT FACTS
AND FIGURES 1 (2013), available at http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Documents/facts
/ICTFactsFigures2013-e.pdf.
176. In the early 1800s, a message from the British government to its representatives in
Delhi would take six weeks. The telegraph cut this time down to days, then hours. DIFFIE
AND LANDAU, supra note 48, at 1; see also Gibson, supra note 47 (explaining that
“cyberspace has everted” and “colonized” our everyday world).
177. While citizens of developed nations may enjoy relatively easy access to the Internet
through multiple means, this is not the case for much of the developing world. Even so,
advances in communications technologies—especially wireless technologies—along with
the continued advancement of communications infrastructure in developing nations have
resulted in an increase of the percentage of developing nation populations using the Internet,
from 7.8% in 2005 to 30.7% in 2013. INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, KEY ICT INDICATORS FOR
DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE WORLD (TOTALS AND PENETRATION
RATES), available at http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Documents/statistics/2013/ITU
_Key_2005-2013_ICT_data.xls.
178. The myriad ways we have integrated computing and the Internet into our daily lives
have brought us to a point where many tasks that would have been seen as miraculous just a
few years ago—such as high-quality audio and video on mobile devices, international video
conferencing via cell phones, and widespread GPS—have become mundane and therefore
transparent. In fact, the ability to put fully functional computers in the tiniest devices is
creating what scholars have referred to as the Internet of Things—the equipping of nearly
every device with computing and networking functionality, thus enabling transformative
uses of new and existing technologies. Cf. Kevin Ashton, That ‘Internet of Things’ Thing,
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These advances have brought with them new and unforeseen opportunities for
governments to implement broad, persistent surveillance programs.179 Courts have
slowly begun to realize the impact these technologies may have on existing Fourth
Amendment doctrine and have started to question the application of existing
jurisprudence to “contemporary forms of communication.”180 Commentators have
debated the usefulness of existing Fourth Amendment norms when considering
new technologies for some time, with mixed results.181
Government use of advances in information technologies to collect and analyze
ever larger and more detailed citizen databases should come as no surprise.
Questions of efficacy aside for the moment, the State’s increased use of data
collection and analysis is a predictable result of the continued realization of
Moore’s Law.182 Furthermore, this growth is not a new phenomenon. Governments
used data collection and analysis long before the post-2001 counterterrorism efforts
to accomplish such well-established goals as crime prevention, delivery of welfare
benefits, and protection of citizens’ rights.183
RFID J. (June 22, 2009), http://www.rfidjournal.com/articles/view?4986.
179. See, e.g., In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of
Historical Cell-Site Info., 809 F. Supp. 2d 113 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (denying the government’s
application for cell-site-location records, observing that the use of GPS data sent by cell
phones could allow for total geographical surveillance by the government); State v. Patino,
No. P1-10-1155A, 2012 R.I. Super. LEXIS 139 (Sept. 4, 2012) (explaining that
contemporary forms of communication, such as text messages, could provide easily
obtainable information to government agencies and are protected under the Fourth
Amendment), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 93 A.3d 40 (R.I. 2014); Courtney M.
Bowman, A Way Forward After Warshak: Fourth Amendment Protections for E-mail, 27
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 809, 815–18 (2012) (describing e-mail technology and protocols and
the information leaked through third-party doctrine); Kerr, supra note 124, at 1012
(discussing Internet communications transmitted over wireless networks that are therefore
vulnerable to eavesdropping); see also supra Introduction (discussing formerly secret NSA
surveillance programs).
180. Patino, 2012 R.I. Super. LEXIS 139, at *128 (“[T]he third-party doctrine [under
Fourth Amendment analysis] is ill-suited for contemporary forms of communication and
thus should not wholly defeat an individual’s expectation of privacy in the contents of his or
her text messages.”).
181. See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths
and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801 (2004) (debating the role courts should take
when considering Fourth Amendment issues arising out of new technologies and their uses).
182. Cf. James X. Dempsey & Lara M. Flint, Commercial Data and National Security,
72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1459, 1459–64 (2004).
183. The two-edged sword of technological advances leading to increased data collection
is not solely a means for social control. Rather, information may be used by governments to
protect citizens’ rights and provide for their welfare:
[T]he surveillance systems of advanced bureaucratic nation-states are not so
much the repressive machines that pessimists imply, but the outcome of
aspirations and strivings for citizenship. If government departments are to treat
people equally . . . then those people must be individually identified. To
exercise the right to vote, one’s name must appear on the electoral roll; to claim
welfare benefits, personal details must be documented. Thus . . . the
individuation that treats people in their own right, rather than merely as
members of families or communities, means freedom from specific constraints
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The government, therefore, has many compelling reasons to collect and store
information about its citizens, and the increasing ease with which we communicate
over the Internet has made it a natural tool for information gathering.184 With the
ability to collect and store virtually all information communicated over the Internet,
the government could apply analytical tools to reveal a very detailed portrait of
who we are based on what we buy, what organizations we belong to, what we read,
and what we watch.185
The base analytical tools made available under existing Fourth Amendment
doctrine are sound but have been gradually (and artificially) limited to a
characterization of the underlying constitutional issues that have little basis in the
Framers’ intent. This characterization, focusing on an ill-defined concept of privacy
and taken from the perspective of the government agent engaged in search and
seizure, has been redefined from a prohibition against impermissible government
intrusions based firmly on the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause186 to a
balancing test which weighs an individual’s right to privacy against the government
interest in effective law enforcement. This balancing test departs from the language
of the Warrant Clause and relies instead on the Reasonableness Clause, based on
the special needs of government.187
but also greater opportunities for surveillance and control on the part of a
centralized state.
DAVID LYON, THE ELECTRONIC EYE: THE RISE OF SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY 32–33 (1994)
(internal quotations omitted). A very early example of government use of citizens’ data to
facilitate governance can be found in the Domesday Book, commissioned in 1086 by
William the Conqueror, which included exhaustive compilations of landholders, tenants,
properties, and their values. This early administrative record keeping established four
characteristics of the surveillance state which survive today: (1) political power was the
essential personage; (2) power was exercised first of all by posing questions, by
interrogating; (3) in order to determine the truth, power appealed to notables to give this
information; and (4) the king consulted the notables without forcing them to tell the truth
through the use of violence, pressure, or torture. Foucault, supra note 24, at 45.
184. As Lawrence Lessig once observed, “[C]yberspace does not guarantee its own
freedom but instead carries an extraordinary potential for control.” LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE
AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 58 (1999).
185. See Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the
Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1138–39 (2002).
186. The protections laid out by the Fourth Amendment are principally found in two
clauses: the Warrant Clause, which requires that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause,” and the Reasonableness Clause, whose somewhat vague language prohibits
“unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
187. See supra Part II.B. But see Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1415 (2013)
(applying trespass analogy when considering whether a drug search by a dog on a home’s
front porch is a search under the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945,
949 (2012) (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886)) (observing the Fourth
Amendment’s “close connection to property” and raising the common-law trespass theory of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence). It remains to be seen whether Jones and its progeny will
yield a new paradigm of Fourth Amendment analysis which relies once again on common-law
trespass as a partial basis. Courts appear skeptical of any significant change in the doctrine.
See United States v. McGuire, No. CR 13-40058, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145175, at *25–31
(D.S.D. Oct. 1, 2013) (questioning the trespass analyses in Jones and Jardines), magistrate
report adopted by 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174657 (D.S.D. Dec. 10, 2013).
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E. Privacy, Secrecy, Security, and Their Measure
One of the more problematic components of the Fourth Amendment “balancing
test” is its dependence on the elusive concept of privacy and its assumed inherent
quantifiability.188 The difficulty with this approach lies both in its implied
conflation of a multitude of privacy definitions and in its use as a “fact” rather than
as a value by the courts.189 While courts appear to agree wholeheartedly in the
abstract concept of privacy as a cherished constitutional value,190 it is not the

188. See, e.g., Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1970 (2013) (“‘[R]ather than
employing a per se rule of unreasonableness, we balance the privacy-related and law
enforcement-related concerns to determine if the intrusion was reasonable.” (emphasis in
original) (quoting Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331 (2001))); Bd. of Educ. v. Earls,
536 U.S. 822, 829 (2002) (“[W]e generally determine the reasonableness of a search by
balancing the nature of the intrusion on the individual’s privacy against the promotion of
legitimate governmental interests.”); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 121 (2001)
(“Although the Fourth Amendment ordinarily requires the degree of probability embodied in
the term ‘probable cause,’ a lesser degree satisfies the Constitution when the balance of
governmental and private interests makes such a standard reasonable.”); United States v.
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 125 (1984) (“To assess the reasonableness of this [search], ‘[w]e
must balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment
interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the
intrusion.’” (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983))); Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979) (“[T]he permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is
judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its
promotion of legitimate government interests.”).
189. Privacy violations can involve a wide variety of harmful or problematic activities.
Daniel Solove lists examples such as newspapers naming rape victims, reporters gaining
entry to a person’s home under false pretenses to photograph her, the use of backscatter
X-ray machines—colloquially known as “virtual strip-search machines” for their ability to
see through clothing—by the U.S. Transportation Security Agency, the government use of
thermal sensors to detect heat emanating from private homes, a company marketing a list of
millions of elderly incontinent women, and a company selling personal information of
customers despite promises not to do so. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 6
(2008). It is plain that all of these patterns are examples of one sort of privacy violation or
another, but they exhibit very different actors and situations. To lump all such examples
under a single concept of privacy either fails to properly recognize the problem or unfairly
conflates these problems to fit a desired rubric.
190. Courts will often speak in reverent tones about the core constitutional importance of
an individual’s privacy, and then follow this homage to the abstract concept with an
explanation why a particular government search was therefore permissible. See, e.g., Skinner
v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 613–16 (1989) (stating that “[t]he [Fourth]
Amendment guarantees the privacy, dignity, and security of persons against certain arbitrary
and invasive acts by officers of the Government or those acting at their discretion,” and the
“physical intrusion” of a blood test “penetrating beneath the skin, infringes an expectation of
privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable,” yet finding that mandatory
government blood and urine tests were reasonable); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 335
(1985) (noting that “‘[t]he basic purpose of [the Fourth] Amendment, as recognized in
countless decisions of this Court, is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals
against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials,’” and “the individual’s interest in
privacy and personal security ‘suffers whether the government’s motivation is to investigate
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principle of privacy but its factual nature that has driven recent decisions.191 Any
Fourth Amendment analysis that treats privacy as merely a factual matter to be
quantified and weighed against the concerns of the government unnecessarily
complicates Fourth Amendment analysis and ignores the much more fundamental
principle first articulated by Justice Brandeis—“the right to be let alone.”192 This
problem becomes especially acute when courts attempt to reconcile the balancing
approach to Fourth Amendment analysis with technological advances that give the
government the ability to invade an individual’s privacy with relatively little (or
no) perceived physical intrusion.193
This shift to a factual analysis and quantification of privacy has not only
drawn the courts’ attention away from the consideration of the fundamental value
of privacy but has also led to some rather strange, fact-specific discussions
involving such topics as garbage left on the curb for collection,194 thermal
violations of criminal laws or breaches of other statutory or regulatory standards,’” before
holding that a public school teacher’s warrantless search of a student’s purse was reasonable
(alteration in original) (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967);
Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312–13 (1978))); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17
(1968) (observing that a police frisk was a “serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person,
which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment,” but holding that such a frisk
was permissible under less than probable cause); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 772
(1966) (upholding a mandatory blood test while noting that “[t]he integrity of an individual’s
person is a cherished value of our society”).
191. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). In Smith, the Court considered
privacy as a fact and held that no reasonable expectation of privacy exists in telephone
numbers dialed, since
[t]elephone users, in sum, typically know that they must convey numerical
information to the phone company; that the phone company has facilities for
recording this information; and that the phone company does in fact record this
information for a variety of legitimate business purposes. Although subjective
expectations cannot be scientifically gauged, it is too much to believe that
telephone subscribers, under these circumstances, harbor any general
expectation that the numbers they dial will remain secret.
Id. at 743. Justice Marshall dissented, observing that privacy was a value independent of the
underlying facts, since “whether privacy expectations are legitimate . . . depends not on the
risks an individual can be presumed to accept when imparting information to third parties,
but on the risks he should be forced to assume in a free and open society.” Id. at 750
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
192. “The makers of our Constitution . . . conferred, as against the Government, the right
to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy
of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth
Amendment.” Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting), overruled in part by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
193. When technological advances give government agents the ability to invade an
individual’s privacy without the need for an actual physical intrusion, courts tend to use a
technologically enabled lesser intrusion as part of the justification for a government search
that otherwise would not be allowed. See Sundby, supra note 134, at 1762–63 (discussing
the courts’ use of a sliding scale of intrusion minimization to compensate for weaker
government justifications for a search).
194. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988) (whether an individual has a privacy
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imaging devices,195 hovering helicopters,196 dogs sniffing near homes,197 dogs
sniffing near cars,198 the legal status of motor homes as actual homes,199 DNA
collection,200 conversations in private driveways,201 and cell phone location
information.202 To put it another way, under current Fourth Amendment doctrine,
courts are not asking whether items, activities, or places should be kept private
according to a set of fundamental values, but whether, under the facts of each case,
we would expect others to be able to observe these items, activities, or places.203
This doctrine runs counter to the Framers’ Fourth Amendment intent. Justice
Brandeis’s famous dissent in Olmstead was the Court’s first pure articulation of the
need to rely on the values and principles underlying the Constitution when
interpreting Fourth Amendment protections.204 This is what Justice Brandeis meant:

interest in garbage left on the curb for collection).
195. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (whether a subjective expectation of
privacy exists against police use of a thermal imaging scanner to detect heat patterns
emanating from a private home).
196. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (whether an individual has a reasonable
expectation of privacy from a helicopter flying four hundred feet above a home).
197. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013) (whether a reasonable expectation of
privacy exists against a drug-sniffing dog being brought onto a porch).
198. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) (whether a reasonable expectation of
privacy exists against a drug-sniffing dog brought alongside a car stopped for speeding).
199. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985) (whether a motor home is more like a car
or a home with respect to privacy expectations).
200. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013) (whether a postarrest—but
preconviction—collection of DNA via a cheek swab was a violation of a reasonable
expectation of privacy).
201. United States v. Scott, 731 F.3d 659 (7th Cir. 2013) (whether an individual has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in conversations that take place in his driveway), cert.
denied, 134 S. Ct. 1806 (2014).
202. United States v. Caraballo, 963 F. Supp. 2d 341 (D. Vt. 2013) (whether an individual
has a reasonable expectation of privacy in real-time cell phone location information).
203. Furthermore, the government may not avoid Fourth Amendment protections of
private papers and communications merely by announcing that citizens should no longer
have an expectation of privacy in these items. For example, in Smith v. Maryland, the
Supreme Court stated that
if the Government were suddenly to announce on nationwide television that all
homes henceforth would be subject to warrantless entry, individuals thereafter
might not in fact entertain any actual expectation of privacy regarding their
homes, papers, and effects. Similarly, if a refugee from a totalitarian country,
unaware of this Nation’s traditions, erroneously assumed that police were
continuously monitoring his telephone conversations, a subjective expectation
of privacy regarding the contents of his calls might be lacking as well. In such
circumstances, where an individual’s subjective expectations had been
“conditioned” by influences alien to well-recognized Fourth Amendment
freedoms, those subjective expectations obviously could play no meaningful
role in ascertaining what the scope of Fourth Amendment protection was.
442 U.S. 735, 740 n.5 (1979). Note that, in light of revelations of government surveillance of
U.S. citizens’ telephone, e-mail, and other electronic information, Justice Blackmun’s words
take on a special—if unintended—meaning.
204. See supra note 192.
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certain items should be free from government intrusion via the individual’s “right
to be let alone.”205 This tenet is a far cry from the case-by-case factual privacy
analysis currently employed in Fourth Amendment cases. But while broad
principles such as this may work well in theory—we think we know a privacy
violation when we see it—they are often too abstract to provide courts with
predictable rules.
In the years since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. government has
exacerbated these issues by adopting an overall doctrine that has prioritized
security above all else, creating what some scholars have called a “constitutional
pathological period” with respect to national security.206 Of course, one of the
government’s primary constitutional duties to its citizens is the maintenance of
national security, and protecting the population from terrorist attacks certainly falls
under this umbrella.207 Some scholars and commentators have argued that the need
for national security in the age of terrorism either allows suspicionless searches
under current Fourth Amendment doctrine or entirely supersedes any need for
“traditional” Fourth Amendment analysis.208 National security is an important

205. See supra Part II.A.
206. See Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 449, 459 (1985); Howard M. Wasserman, Constitutional Pathology, the
War on Terror, and United States v. Klein, 5 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 211, 215–16
(2011). Professors Blasi and Wasserman define pathological periods of our constitutional
government as periods marked by a “sense of urgency stemming from societal disorientation
if not panic.” Blasi, supra, at 468. Their defining characteristic is “a shift in basic attitudes,
among certain influential actors if not the public at large,” about central constitutional tenets.
Id. at 467. This panic “affects structural features and arrangements, such as formal and
informal separation of powers and checks and balances, which may exert much less of a
restraining influence on the political branches and the public.” Wasserman, supra, at 215
(internal quotations omitted).
207.
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union,
establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence,
promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves
and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States
of America.
U.S. CONST. pmbl.
208. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME
OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY 4, 31 (2006) (arguing that “[t]he core meaning of ‘civil liberties’
is freedom from coercive or otherwise intrusive governmental actions designed to secure the
nation against real or, sometimes, imagined internal and external enemies,” but courts must
engage in a pragmatic cost-benefit analysis to determine the proper balance between the
interests in liberty against those of national security); Ricardo J. Bascuas, Fourth Amendment
Lessons from the Highway and the Subway: A Principled Approach to Suspicionless
Searches, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 719, 722 (2007) (arguing that the case for suspicionless New
York City subway searches is “relatively easy to make,” where the “threat of terrorism
promises to proliferate suspicionless searches”); Ronald M. Gould & Simon Stern,
Catastrophic Threats and the Fourth Amendment, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 777, 777–78 (2004)
(arguing that “traditional Fourth Amendment search-and-seizure doctrine was fine for an age
of flintlocks” but that “large-scale searches undertaken to prevent horrific potential harms
may be constitutionally sound”); Richard C. Worf, The Case for Rational Basis Review of
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purpose of government, but it is not its sole purpose, and to elevate antiterrorism to
a status that overshadows other values risks the corrosion of our constitutional
foundations through a number of possible causes.209
Furthermore, similar to the concept of privacy, we often have a difficult time
defining exactly what “security” means, despite the fact that the rationale for the
privacy-security balance appears to be a given in such discussions.210 Some
commentators have suggested that governments, including the United States,
leverage and politicize these ontological ambiguities to promote specific
foreign-policy objectives, for example, declaring war on terrorism without a
particular definition of what that means in real terms.211 For primarily this reason,
commentators have called into question the presumed existence of a measurable
privacy-security balance.212

General Suspicionless Searches and Seizures, 23 TOURO L. REV. 93, 131–37 (2007) (stating
that suspicionless searches should be seen as reasonable, and therefore constitutional, if they
have been approved by the legislature).
209. Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule categorize the various security policies
implemented after September 11, 2011, which include military action, the detention of
enemy combatants outside the theater of hostilities, heightened search and surveillance
powers, ethnicity-based search and surveillance, coercive interrogation, immigration sweeps
and surveillance, enactment of terrorism and material-support statutes, military trials, and
censorship. ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY,
LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS 7–9 (2007).
210. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 545 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment) (“For reasons of inescapable human
nature, the branch of the Government asked to counter a serious threat is not the branch on
which to rest the Nation’s entire reliance in striking the balance between the will to win and
the cost in liberty on the way to victory; the responsibility for security will naturally amplify
the claim that security legitimately raises.”); United States v. Warsame, 547 F. Supp. 2d 982,
992 n.10 (D. Minn. 2008) (“[C]ourts upholding the constitutionality of [the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act] have done so not because a FISA order is a ‘warrant,’ but
because . . . FISA strikes a reasonable balance between governmental interests in national
security and individual liberty interests.”); Doe v. Gonzales, 500 F. Supp. 2d 379, 408−09
(S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“‘[T]he high stakes here pressing the scales . . . compel the Court to strike
the most sensitive judicial balance, calibrating by delicate increments toward a result that
adequately protects national security without unduly sacrificing individual freedoms.’”
(quoting Doe v. Ashcroft, 33 F. Supp. 2d 471, 478 (2004))), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub
nom. John Doe, Inc. v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 861 (2d Cir. 2008); DAVID COLE & JULES LOBEL,
LESS SAFE, LESS FREE: WHY AMERICA IS LOSING THE WAR ON TERROR 101 (2007) (“[T]here
are deep-rooted reasons why government officials are unlikely to balance security and the
rule of law fairly or accurately in times of crisis . . . .”).
211. See, e.g., Alexander J. Marcopoulos, Terrorizing Rhetoric: The Advancement of
U.S. Hegemony Through the Lack of a Definition of ‘Terror’ 2–3 (Jan. 13, 2009)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=1327155 (arguing that the United States has used ambiguous definitions of security and
terrorism to its political advantage).
212. See, e.g., David Cole, No Reason To Believe: Radical Skepticism, Emergency
Power, and Constitutional Constraint, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1329, 1334 (2008) (stating that the
argument “that there is a necessary and straightforward tradeoff between liberty and security
is far too simplistic” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Stephen Holmes,
In Case of Emergency: Misunderstanding Tradeoffs in the War on Terror, 97 CALIF. L. REV.
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III. PERSISTENT SURVEILLANCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL WARINESS OF STATE POWER
The origins of the Fourth Amendment can be traced to early Americans’
antipathy toward general warrants, which gave British agents authority to conduct
indiscriminate, suspicionless searches of people and their homes.213 While these
general warrants led, of course, to privacy problems, the true underlying issue in
this context was the individual’s relationship to the State and the need to keep a
check on the balance of power in that relationship. Scholars and commentators
have called for greater reinforcement of this constitutional principle, urging courts
to think of the Fourth Amendment as “security from unreasonable governmental
intrusion,” which follows directly from the Framers’ distaste for the “arbitrary
exercise of [British government] power to invade their property.”214
The shift of Fourth Amendment doctrine’s focus to one of privacy limits the
amendment’s ability to protect citizens from arbitrary government power. Justice
Jackson observed that the Fourth Amendment was meant to protect more than
privacy alone; it was meant to ensure that government intrusions of individual
privacy are based on rules established and overseen by the citizens.215 The current
use of a Fourth Amendment balancing test between government need and
individual privacy has taken this oversight away from individuals and instead
established it in courts and law enforcement.
The ease with which government agencies can now conduct persistent,
collective surveillance on every citizen heightens the need to reorient Fourth
Amendment doctrine back to its roots in the constitutional principle: to protect
individuals from overwhelming government power. Some scholars have
characterized this reorientation as a need for a balance of power.216 This approach
often places too much emphasis on courts’ abilities to effectively judge (and
attenuate) a swinging pendulum of Fourth Amendment doctrine and bears too much
301, 313 (2009) (observing that “the master metaphor dominating discussions of the war on
terror is the idea of a necessary tradeoff between liberty and security” but that the “metaphor
is loaded” because “it is seductively easy to illustrate”); Jeremy Waldron, Safety and
Security, 85 NEB. L. REV. 454, 456 (2006) (“Although we know that ‘security’ is a vague and
ambiguous concept, and though we should suspect that its vagueness is a source of danger
when talk of trade-offs is in the air, still there has been little or no attempt in the literature of
legal and political theory to bring any sort of clarity to the concept.” (footnote omitted)).
213. The Founders’ concerns about unabated government power are shown in three
seminal search-and-seizure cases that predate the Constitution: Wilkes v. Wood, (1763) 95
Eng. Rep. 766 (K.B.); 2 Vent. 69; Entick v. Carrington, (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B.); 19
How. St. Tri. 1030; and the Writs of Assistance Case, see M.H. SMITH, THE WRITS OF
ASSISTANCE CASE (1978); see also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 463 (1928)
(observing that the “well known historical purpose of the Fourth Amendment” was “directed
against general warrants and writs of assistance”), overruled in part by Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967); Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98
MICH. L. REV. 547, 558 (1999).
214. Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: Property, Privacy,
or Security?, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307, 351−52 (1998).
215. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
216. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 139 (arguing that constantly changing technologies and
social practices require the Supreme Court to adjust Fourth Amendment protections to
achieve a power equilibrium between citizens and government).
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uncomfortable resemblance to the current balancing-test jurisprudence. I
recommend, rather, that courts evaluate Fourth Amendment problems posed by
mass-surveillance programs by recognizing their true social cost and assessing the
fundamental constitutional tenet that protects the individual citizen from the
overwhelming power of the State.217
A. The Cost of Persistent, Collective Surveillance
As illustrated in Part II.D, supra, a protocol calling for the suspicionless,
systematic, and physical search of every citizen would not long survive, largely due
to the impossibility of such a protocol’s practical application and the resentment it
would generate among citizens. But what happens when technological advances
allow government to collect and store the electronic data we generate, completely
unbeknownst to the person being searched? The government can avoid the twin
checks of limited police resources and community hostility that ordinarily constrain
abusive law-enforcement practices. This new model of surveillance threatens a
value just as fundamental to Fourth Amendment analysis as privacy—the mutual
trust between government and the governed necessary in any democratic society.218
In a 1974 law review article, former Chief Justice William Rehnquist posed the
following hypothetical to illustrate the tension between the normative concept of

217. The Founders were quite clear on the need for this constitutional principle. For
example, James Madison had expressed this view in a letter to Thomas Jefferson on the
subject of a possible Bill of Rights:
In our Governments the real power lies in the majority of the Community, and
the invasion of private rights is cheifly [sic] to be apprehended, not from acts of
Government contrary to the sense of its constituents, but from acts in which the
Government is the mere instrument of the major number of the constituents. . . .
[But] there may be occasions on which the evil may spring from [government
self-interest]; and on such, a bill of rights will be a good ground for an appeal to
the sense of the community.
Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 11 THE PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON 295, 298−99 (Robert A. Rutland & Charles F. Hobson eds., 1977).
218. The inherent threat to constitutional values from persistent, collective surveillance
was acknowledged by Justice Sotomayor in United States. v. Jones:
In cases involving even short-term monitoring, some unique attributes of GPS
surveillance relevant to the Katz analysis will require particular attention. GPS
monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person’s public
movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political,
professional, religious, and sexual associations. The Government can store such
records and efficiently mine them for information years into the future. [United
States v.] Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir. 2010) (opinion of
Kozinski, C.J.). And because GPS monitoring is cheap in comparison to
conventional surveillance techniques and, by design, proceeds surreptitiously, it
evades the ordinary checks that constrain abusive law enforcement practices:
“limited police resources and community hostility.”
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955−56 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citations
omitted). While Justice Sotomayor was addressing the specific issue of surreptitious GPS
tracking, the principles she articulates apply to all such “invisible” techniques of government
surveillance.
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privacy and privacy as interpreted by the Fourth Amendment.219 In the
hypothetical, the reader is asked to imagine that a police officer is required to stand
in the parking lot of a bar from the hours of 5:30 p.m. to 7:30 p.m. every day.220
During this time, the police officer records the license plate of every car that parks
in the bar’s parking lot in order to make a list of the bar’s regular customers.221 For
the purposes of the hypothetical, Rehnquist asked the reader to assume that the
police officer has no reason to know of any unlawful conduct at the bar or by the
bar’s customers.222
As Rehnquist points out in his article, this type of persistent surveillance, with
no knowledge of any unlawful conduct or other special circumstances, would strike
most Americans as an improper police function, with a substantial segment reacting
with an “affirmative dislike” of this unwarranted surveillance.223 But these same
people would likely agree that driving a car down a public street to an open parking
lot adjacent to a bar that is open to the public is not a private act in a normative
sense of the term. In fact, any private citizen, newspaper reporter, or survey taker
would have the right to do exactly what the police officer in the hypothetical was
doing. The difference, as many would see it, is that this sort of baseless, persistent
surveillance is not a proper government function.224 Chief Justice Rehnquist
attributed this common reaction to his hypothetical’s “extreme” set of facts.225
But what may have been considered an extreme—and unworkable—program
of persistent surveillance in 1974 is no longer just material for boundary-seeking
law school hypotheticals. Rather, breathtaking advances in technology have
become so commonplace that they have been blended into our everyday lives and
have been allowed to take up residence among some of our most private of
activities, while these same technologies make possible the persistent,
collective-surveillance programs conducted by the NSA. These warrantless
surveillance programs have a toxic effect on fundamental constitutional
principles and values that go beyond mere privacy and are therefore prohibited by
“the traditional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures afforded
by the common law at the time of the framing.”226

219. William H. Rehnquist, Is an Expanded Right of Privacy Consistent with Fair and
Effective Law Enforcement? Or: Privacy, You’ve Come a Long Way, Baby, 23 U. KAN. L.
REV. 1, 9 (1974).
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931 (1995). In Wilson, Justice Thomas explained
that although “reasonableness” is a key consideration in the modern Court’s Fourth
Amendment analysis, the reasonableness of a challenged search or seizure “may be guided
by the meaning ascribed to it by the Framers of the Amendment.” Id.
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B. Checks on Arbitrariness of State Power
The Constitution was written to provide citizens with substantive protections
against arbitrary and oppressive government actions227 and, as such, is based
squarely upon the principle of limited grants of power to governments.228 Inherent
in these protections is the legitimate constitutional need to control the discretion of
government agents in order to prevent arbitrary surveillance without any Fourth
Amendment oversight or restraint; however, technological advancements and the
near-ubiquity of networked computing and communications have hampered our
usual means of oversight.229
Following Katz, the Supreme Court has approached this problem by considering
certain factors in order to determine whether the government’s use of a new
technology fits into the categories of searches precluded by the Founders.230 But
this approach is a formalistic adherence to Katz, at best. What is missing from this
analysis is an examination of the constitutional values at stake beyond mere
physical privacy.231 Rather than maintaining focus on government needs or

227. One can look to the doctrine of substantive due process for ample evidence of the
Court’s long recognition of this constitutional principle, which is seen as a “bulwark[] . . .
against arbitrary” government action. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 532–36 (1884)
(concluding that “arbitrary exertions of power,” even those that are “legislative in form,”
violate due process); see also Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235, 244
(1819) (“As to the words from Magna Charta, incorporated into the constitution of
Maryland, after volumes spoken and written with a view to their exposition, the good sense
of mankind has at length settled down to this: that they were intended to secure the
individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government, unrestrained by the
established principles of private rights and distributive justice.”).
228.
We may rely on the conditions which existed when the Constitution was
adopted . . . . [T]hat government by the people instituted by the Constitution
would not imitate the conduct of arbitrary monarchs. The abuse of power
might, indeed, be apprehended, but not that it would be manifested in
provisions or practices which would shock the sensibilities of men.
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 375 (1910).
229. This is not a new problem, of course. Congress recognized this issue over two
decades ago. See ROBERT W. KASTENMEIER, H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, ELECTRONIC
COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY ACT OF 1986, H.R. REP. NO. 99-647 (1986).
When the Framers of the Constitution acted to guard against the arbitrary use of
government power to maintain surveillance over citizens, there were limited
methods of intrusion into the “houses, papers and effects” protected by the
Fourth Amendment. During the intervening 200 years, development of new
methods of communication and devices for surveillance has expanded
dramatically the opportunity for such intrusions.
Id. at 16.
230. See Christopher Slobogin, Technologically-Assisted Physical Surveillance: The
American Bar Association’s Tentative Draft Standards, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 383,
398−404 (1997) (summarizing factors used in case law).
231. As Professor Amsterdam has observed,
The ultimate question, plainly, is a value judgment. It is whether, if the
particular form of surveillance practiced by the police is permitted to go
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bemoaning a loss of government efficiency, courts should reorient their point of
view to reestablish the Fourth Amendment as a citizens’ tool to regulate
government power.232 The focus, therefore, should be shifted away from the
reasonable expectation of privacy balancing test, since “[i]n many instances, what is
or isn’t protected by the Fourth Amendment bears no relation to the problems caused
by government information gathering.” Instead, consideration should be paid to
“whether it is best to have judicial oversight of law-enforcement activity, what that
oversight should consist of, how much limitation we want to impose on various
government activities, and how we should guard against abuses of power.”233
Professor Kerr’s equilibrium adjustment theory234 and Professor Ohm’s
improvements upon that theory235 seek to provide practical advice to judges on a
shift in Fourth Amendment doctrine from privacy to power. Ohm argues that the
relationship between private and public surveillance, where commercial
technologies such as cell phones and social networks are gradually becoming
omniscient, is turning the current privacy-oriented doctrine from a “slow and
partial degradation of the Fourth Amendment” into a “full evisceration.”236 Both
approaches suggest that courts reorient their Fourth Amendment balancing test to
one that (somehow) measures the balance of power between government and
citizen. To apply this measurement, Ohm suggests a metric that strives to maintain
a “fixed ratio between [government] efficiency and individual liberty,” which
courts adjust as our technology continues to improve, thus enforcing a constant—
and relatively increasing—level of government inefficiency.237
Regardless of the approach, any move from privacy to power as a core fixture of
Fourth Amendment doctrine will not come without some amount of disruption.
This new paradigm would shift the costs back to the government, and the
perspective back to the individual, and would force the reevaluation of post-Katz
jurisprudence. If the constitutional norm that seeks to protect citizens from
government power through unwarranted intrusions once again becomes the focus
of the Court’s Fourth Amendment doctrine, our freedom from arbitrary
governmental action will receive the proper attention from the “federal institutional
processes established to protect that freedom.”238

unregulated by constitutional restraints, the amount of privacy and freedom
remaining to citizens would be diminished to a compass inconsistent with the
aims of a free and open society.
Amsterdam, supra note 136, at 403.
232. As noted by Justice Brandeis, our constitutional system of checks and balances “was
adopted by the [Framers], not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary
power. The purpose was, not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction
incident to the distribution of the governmental powers . . . to save the people from
autocracy.” Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
233. SOLOVE, supra note 15, at 115.
234. See Kerr, supra note 139.
235. Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment in a World Without Privacy, 81 MISS. L.J.
1309 (2012).
236. Id. at 1311.
237. Id. at 1346.
238. Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV.
67, 88 (1960).
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IV. COLLECTIVE SUSPICION’S CORROSIVE EFFECT ON MUTUAL SOCIETAL TRUST
A. The Importance of Social Trust in a Constitutional Democracy
The Founders’ conception of the Constitution was of a “constitution of
principle,” securing basic liberties and protecting core values, as opposed to a mere
“constitution of detail,” which simply enumerates a discrete list of rights.239
Further, scholars such as the philosopher John Rawls have interpreted the
Constitution as an agreement specifying certain liberties in terms of our capacity
for a sense of justice and our capacity for a conception of the overall good.240 Thus,
our Constitution is meant to embody the values we see as necessary for social
cooperation and governance, which must be based on mutual respect and trust.241
Societies without trust tend toward the Hobbesian end of the spectrum and lack
the sort of peaceful, stable, and productive communities the Framers intended.242

239. RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION,
EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 119 (1993) (emphasis omitted) (coining and
contrasting a “constitution of principle”—a coherent set of abstract, normative principles and
values—with a “constitution of detail”—a particularized list of rules); see also Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003) (“Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the components of
liberty in its manifold possibilities, they might have been more specific. They did not
presume to have this insight. They knew times can blind us to certain truths and later
generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to
oppress. As the Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in
their own search for greater freedom.”).
240. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 36–37 (1996). Rawls’s theory of justice as
fairness translates to a constitutional conception of a fair system of social cooperation. Rawls
asserts that citizens of a constitutional democracy apply their capacity for a sense of justice
when evaluating the justice of social institutions and policies. Similarly, Rawls states that
this sense is coupled with our pursuit of a conception of the good, or what is valuable in
human life. See id. at 15–20, 29–35, 302, 332.
241. The absence of mutual trust can poison even the simplest of social or commercial
interactions. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, Gifts and Exchanges, in ALTRUISM, MORALITY,
AND ECONOMIC THEORY 13, 15 (Edmund S. Phelps ed., 1975) (citing the foundational
importance of trust in commercial transactions); Partha Dasgupta, Trust as a Commodity, in
TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING COOPERATIVE RELATIONS 49, 64 (Diego Gambetta ed., 1988)
(defining trust as a public good); Carol M. Rose, Giving, Trading, Thieving, and Trusting:
How and Why Gifts Become Exchanges, and (More Importantly) Vice Versa, 44 FLA. L. REV.
295, 311–313 (1992) (examining how trust is essential to social exchange).
242. Political theorists strenuously emphasized the importance of societal trust at the time
of the Framing. See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 124 (Thomas
P. Peardon ed., The Liberal Arts Press, Inc. 1952) (1690) (“Whensoever, therefore, the
legislative shall transgress this fundamental rule of society, and either by ambition, fear, folly,
or corruption, endeavor to grasp themselves, or put into the hands of any other, an absolute
power over the lives, liberties, and estates of the people; by this breach of trust they forfeit the
power the people had put into their hands for quite contrary ends, and it devolves to the people,
who have a right to resume their original liberty, and, by the establishment of a new legislative,
such as they shall think fit, provide for their own safety and security, which is the end for which
they are in society.”); see also 1 JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY ch.
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Societal trust, in this sense, can be defined as “the actor’s belief that, at worst,
others will not knowingly or willingly do him harm, and at best, that they will act
in his interests.”243 The essence of this theme has been distilled into the description
“encapsulated interest.”244 Just as people can build reputations of trustworthiness,
so can governments. And just as personal betrayals can destroy individual
relationships, a society’s health is “dependent . . . on the justice of their
community’s political decisions.”245 History provides ample empirical evidence of
the widespread problems that arise in societies with low levels of trust.246
B. The Costs Associated with a Collapse of Trust: Trust as a Constitutional Value
The once-revolutionary concept of mutual trust between government and citizen
is firmly embedded as a fundamental value underlying this nation’s society. Justice
Brandeis articulated the basis of the Fourth Amendment as that of the “right to be
let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men.”247 This core principle has been a basis of our constitutional system of
government since its inception.248 Since our government is granted legitimacy only
vii, § 5, at 110 (J.M. Robson ed., Univ. of Toronto Press 1965) (1848) (“Conjoint action is
possible just in proportion as human beings can rely on each other. There are countries in
Europe, of first-rate industrial capabilities, where the most serious impediment to conducting
business concerns on a large scale, is the rarity of persons who are supposed fit to be trusted
with the receipt and expenditure of large sums of money.”); GEORG SIMMEL, THE SOCIOLOGY
OF GEORG SIMMEL 318 (Kurt H. Wolff ed. & trans., The Free Press 1950) (trust “is one of the
most important synthetic forces within society”).
243. Kenneth Newton, Trust, Social Capital, Civil Society, and Democracy, 22 INT’L
POL. SCI. REV. 201, 202 (2001). The concept of trust can be somewhat slippery to define, and
largely depends on context. David Good has offered a functional definition of trust, where
“trust is based on an individual’s theory as to how another person will perform on some
future occasion.” David Good, Individuals, Interpersonal Relations, and Trust, in TRUST:
MAKING AND BREAKING COOPERATIVE RELATIONS, supra note 241, at 31, 33 (footnote
omitted). Another helpful description belies our need to rely on one another in society: “trust is
a device for coping with the freedom of other persons.” John Dunn, Trust and Political Agency,
in TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING COOPERATIVE RELATIONS, supra note 241, at 73, 80.
244. RUSSELL HARDIN, TRUST AND TRUSTWORTHINESS 25–27 (2002).
245. Ronald Dworkin, Liberal Community, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 479, 502 (1989).
246. Levels of trust shown in social surveys are good indicators of the overall
trustworthiness of the societies in which the survey respondents live, telling us more about
the societies and their structures than about the individual personality types. See ROBERT D.
PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY 138
(2000). Further studies have shown that wealthier nations, and those with greater income
equality, have higher levels of trust than poorer and more unequal ones. See Ronald
Inglehart, Trust, Well-Being and Democracy, in DEMOCRACY AND TRUST 88 (Mark E.
Warren ed., 1999). As one scholar puts it, “Social life without trust would be intolerable and,
most likely, quite impossible.” Newton, supra note 243, at 202.
247. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting),
overruled in part by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
248. As Justice Brandeis so eloquently put it:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the
pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man’s spiritual
nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the
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through the trust citizens confer via regular elections, this principle is interwoven
into the very nature of our institutions.
The Fourth Amendment is a direct result of the Founders’ constitutional value of
reciprocal trust. Specifically, this amendment requires that government trust its
citizens to act responsibly, a principle that is violated when government is allowed
to step into citizens’ lives without first finding that a citizen has given up that trust
by failing to act responsibly.249 This governing constitutional principle is made
even plainer in comparison to totalitarian governments, which maintain power and
exercise control by sending a strong message to their citizens that the State is
superior to the individual, doing so through monitored communications, random
searches, and the use of citizen-informants.250 Where totalitarian governments tend
to maintain stability only through force and control, the long-term stability of our
constitutional form of government is due in large part to the value of reciprocal
trust between the State and its citizens, which grants those citizens the right and
ability to participate in this society in a meaningful way.251
While it is unlikely that government’s use of collective surveillance will produce
the sort of widespread unrest and violence that has resulted from racial alienation
pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They
sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and
their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let
alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men.
Id.
249. This trust by government of its citizens was a crucial innovation in liberal
democracy:
Liberal, pluralist democracy is primarily procedural. Its consensus about
procedure . . . is the foundation for mutual trust at least in the political arena.
Although this consensus does not have to be universal, it does have to be
widespread.
....
. . . [M]utal trust, . . . politically defined, is the confidence in or reliance on
others who are also committed to a way of conducting and resolving disputes
about values; it is the expectation that they will generally comply with the
outcomes even when they do not endorse them.
JAMES F. CHILDRESS, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND TRUST 7 (1975) (emphases omitted).
250. Maria Los provides excellent examples and analysis of manifestations in former
Communist nations and how these legacies affect their current governments in the digital age.
Maria Los, A Trans-Systemic Surveillance: The Legacy of Communist Surveillance in the
Digital Age, in SURVEILLANCE AND DEMOCRACY 173 (Kevin D. Haggerty & Minas Samatas
eds., 2010) (describing the surveillance methods left behind in formerly Communist states and
applied to new technologies since 9/11, along with their corrosive effects on those societies).
251. For examples of what can happen when this reciprocal trust breaks down and
individuals feel powerless to meaningfully affect the system, we can look to the rioting and
unrest that has taken place when the government has shown contempt for certain subgroups
of the population through biased legislation or unjust law enforcement. See, e.g., DENNIS E.
GALE, UNDERSTANDING URBAN UNREST: FROM REVEREND KING TO RODNEY KING (1996)
(examining government response to unrest and violence over alienation and lack of
participation); Sheldon G. Levy, Dimensions of Attitudes Toward Race Relations and
Polarized Subgroups in Detroit Following the 1967 Riot, 6 PROC. ANN. CONVENTION AM.
PSYCHOL. ASS’N. 307 (1971) (analyzing alienation and race relations as causes of rioting).
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and societal powerlessness, milder results such as increased individual cynicism
leading to decreased participation or outright mistrust of government agencies and
agents can be just as destructive to our democratic society, with the possible
devolution of our government into the sort of aristocratic enterprise the Founders
wanted to avoid.252 Further, it is not clear that that these corrosive government
practices have any real benefit that might provide some argument in support of
their use.253 The continued misrepresentation of these programs only serves to
enhance the levels of mistrust citizens have for their government.254 A widespread
failure of trust of government by its citizens can only serve to harm the complex
balance our society has put in place.
CONCLUSION
The Framers of the Constitution were quite clear in their intent to protect
citizens from unwarranted intrusions by their government, and this principle was
embedded into our constitutional form of government through the language of the
Fourth Amendment. While it is expected that government should provide for our
common defense, a democratic society such as ours cannot long tolerate secret
government surveillance programs that collect, store, and analyze our private
communications and papers, with no individualized suspicion of wrongdoing and
no basis in law. The needs of national security should not blind us to the legal and
societal costs of collective surveillance, nor should we be willing to sacrifice our
constitutional values in a quixotic pursuit of perfect security.
This is not a question of whether government needs to conduct directed
surveillance in its defense capacity—of course it does. But it should do so without
violating the reciprocal trust of citizens and without stepping over the constitutional
protections from unwarranted governmental intrusions.255 Justice Robert Jackson

252. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131,
1140 (1991).
253. In a hearing held before the Senate Judiciary Committee, NSA Director Keith
Alexander admitted that only thirteen of the fifty-four instances the NSA cited as terrorism
plots foiled through collective surveillance had any connection to the United States. Further,
Director of National Intelligence James Clapper claimed that, even though there were few
examples of any real benefits to the NSA’s persistent, collective-surveillance programs, the real
measure that should be applied to judge the success of these programs is the “peace of mind
metric.” Yochai Benkler, Fact: The NSA Gets Negligible Intel from Americans’ Metadata. So
End Collection, GUARDIAN (Oct. 8, 2013, 12:02 PM), http://www.theguardian.com
/commentisfree/2013/oct/08/nsa-bulk-metadata-surveillance-intelligence.
254. See CHILDRESS, supra note 249, at 7 (“[M]utual trust . . . politically defined, is the
confidence in or reliance on others who are also committed to a way of conducting and
resolving disputes about values; it is the expectation that they will generally comply with the
outcomes even when they do not endorse them.”).
255. It is worth noting that there has been a cooling of support within some corners of
government for the broad surveillance programs initiated in the weeks and months following
the attacks of September 11, 2001. See, e.g., Siobhan Gorman, Leahy Bill Seen as Best
Chance for a Revamp to Surveillance, WALL ST. J., July 30, 2014, at A5. This shift in
thinking appears to be part of an overall reexamination of post-9/11 government policies. It
is too soon to tell, however, exactly what effect these efforts might have on Fourth
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warned that this tension between security and liberty should not lead us to a
constitutional “suicide pact” by ignoring common sense and seeking purity of
doctrine.256 But at what point does an imminent danger overwhelm our
constitutional right to liberty? This nation and its Constitution have survived even
greater existential threats than those we face today. It is not as clear that our society
would be able to survive the corrosive effects of collective surveillance. The
atrophy of civil liberties would be a “suicide pact” of a different kind, where the
loss of our constitutional principles of protection from undue government power
and of mutual trust between government and citizen makes our current models of
society and government unsustainable.257
Contrary to what some within the intelligence community might believe or wish
to be true, our society has never operated under the supposition that government
agents are entitled to every fact about every individual.258 Technological
advancements have eliminated some of the natural physical boundaries that
prevented collective, persistent surveillance programs such as the suspicionless
decryption program revealed in the Snowden documents—our system of laws must
adjust to fill these gaps. As these physical hurdles continue to fall, default Fourth
Amendment doctrine should likewise continue to deny government intrusions
without individualized, articulable suspicion. To do otherwise is to relinquish our

Amendment doctrine, especially when it comes to questions—real or perceived—of national
security.
256.
This Court has gone far toward accepting the doctrine that civil liberty means
. . . that all local attempts to maintain order are impairments of the liberty of the
citizen. The choice is not between order and liberty. It is between liberty with
order and anarchy without either. There is a danger that, if the Court does not
temper its doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom, it will convert the
constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact.
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
257. It is notable that Justice Jackson, despite his warnings of a Fourth Amendment
“suicide pact,” also made clear his awareness of the dangers inherent in failing to protect
citizens’ civil liberties:
[Rights under the Fourth Amendment], I protest, are not mere second-class
rights but belong in the catalog of indispensable freedoms. Among deprivations
of rights, none is so effective in cowing a population, crushing the spirit of the
individual and putting terror in every heart. Uncontrolled search and seizure is
one of the first and most effective weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary
government. And one need only briefly to have dwelt and worked among a
people possessed of many admirable qualities but deprived of these rights to
know that the human personality deteriorates and dignity and self-reliance
disappear where homes, persons and possessions are subject at any hour to
unheralded search and seizure by the police.
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180–81 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
258. Documents leaked by Mr. Snowden have revealed government agencies and
programs “intent on maintaining [their] dominance in intelligence collection,” with plans to
“expand [their] surveillance powers,” without any apparent internal boundaries. James Risen
& Laura Poitras, N.S.A. Report Outlined Goals for More Power, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2013,
at A1; see also Scott Shane, No Morsel Too Minuscule for All-Consuming N.S.A., N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 3, 2013, at A1.
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constitutional checks on government power and destroy the mutual trust necessary
for our society to function.
Rethinking Fourth Amendment doctrine is not, of course, an easy or
straightforward task. My suggested course at this point, however, is a return to the
Brandeisian examination of the “privacies of life,” which suffer when warrantless,
unparticularized government surveillance becomes “the invasion of his indefeasible
right of personal security, personal liberty and private property.”259 Work must be
done to recenter Fourth Amendment thought around fundamental constitutional
values and avoid the fact-specific hair-splitting that the reasonable expectation of
privacy test has yielded.

259. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474–75 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting),
overruled in part by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).

